| 研究生: |
黃翊庭 Huang, Yi-Ting |
|---|---|
| 論文名稱: |
供應鏈之時間型租賃分享模式 A Time-based leasing sharing model in the supply chain |
| 指導教授: |
林正章
Lin, Cheng-Chang |
| 學位類別: |
碩士 Master |
| 系所名稱: |
管理學院 - 交通管理科學系 Department of Transportation and Communication Management Science |
| 論文出版年: | 2014 |
| 畢業學年度: | 102 |
| 語文別: | 中文 |
| 論文頁數: | 102 |
| 中文關鍵詞: | 營收分享 、時間型租賃分享 、毀約 |
| 外文關鍵詞: | Revenue sharing, Time-based leasing-sharing, Break-lease |
| 相關次數: | 點閱:108 下載:4 |
| 分享至: |
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近年來,由於智慧型手機的興起,逐漸取代傳統手機,成為市場上的主要通訊產品。智慧型手機單價高,電信營運商以補貼方式,吸引客戶簽訂月租契約,客戶以每月繳納月租費方式,分攤手機購買價格。由於電信商大部分是以客戶每月支付固定的月租費為主要營收方式,若能將下游營收模式應用於與上游的契約中,可使電信商對於其資金的運作更具彈性,在銷售初期願意訂購更多的產品以滿足需求。因此本篇將以營收分享契約為研究主體,配合電信業者與客戶間簽訂月租契約的運作模式,在上游的通路中,加入時間軸之概念,將營收分享機制延伸為租賃分享,並分析當客戶毀約(Break-lease)時對於通路商決策的影響。本研究考慮兩種不同的市場銷售型態,由於其所對應的付款方式不同,因此針對通路的付款型態加入適用的上游通路合作模式,而本篇主要透過利潤分享的方式,以最大化通路利潤,並提高供應鏈運作績效。在利潤分享的前提下,本篇考慮兩種研究情境,(1)為零售商主導之利潤分享,(2)為系統最佳化情境。在零售商主導之情境下,研究發現其結果非為一雙贏契約,故透過系統最佳化情境作為後續調整標竿,藉由調整通路決策變數的方式以求得一組供應商之妥協區間,表示在雙方皆可以提升利潤的前提下,供應商願意妥協的價格範圍。在月租型式的銷售下,由於顧客毀約的狀況會造成通路的損失,研究中建立一時間型租賃分享的機制,透過調整市場價格、庫存量與相關契約參數,有效減緩下游毀約的影響,並透過供應鏈成員間風險分攤的方式以降低通路損失。本研究希冀透過研究成果與數值資料提供具體上的建議,以供學術界與業界未來發展上使用。
In this research, we develop a time-based leasing sharing model in the supply chain which is fit to the industries having the property of leasing. Due to the nature of communication industry, revenues of operators mostly based on the fixed monthly fee paid by customers. To improve channel efficiency, we use the concept of revenue-sharing to coordinate the supply chain. Traditional RS model is based on the one-payment received from the customers. But Time-based LS model is based on the monthly fee paid by the customers. However, in the LS model, risks will occur when customers break the lease. So, we will consider the impacts of break-lease on the supply chain and analyze the benefits after adopting time-based leasing sharing model. In the leasing sharing model, we premediate two different scenarios, and primarily focus on the situation where retailer dominates. We use the system optimization as a benchmark to derive a supplier’s compromise-space where channel partners both have entice to join the sharing model. By the channel cooperation, we can reduce the damage caused by the break-lease and also decrease the fluctuation of market price in lest the downstream demand decreases sharply. In the analytical results, we can conclude that channel will be better off after adopting leasing sharing mechanism, and the supply chain partners both will enhace their profit by joining the new leasing sharing contract.
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