可轉換公司債的轉換與否最主要取決於標的股票之股價，而可轉債往往被視為間接權益融資的工具，因此本研究欲探討公司是否為了促進可轉債的轉換而進行作價，以及具何種財務特性或公司治理特性的公司其作價程度較明顯。
本研究將以上市櫃公司於民國95年至民國105年間發行且在此期間到期的可轉換公司債為樣本，檢視在轉換日前的累積異常報酬，並且依照是否提前轉換完畢分組，將其累積異常報酬率分別與財務特性(負債比率、現金流量比率、每股盈餘)、公司治理特性(經理人持股比例、外部董事比例、董監持股比例、機構投資人持股比例、董事會規模)進行迴歸分析，探討與作價程度的關聯性。
實證結果顯示，無論在全樣本、提前轉換完畢與未提前轉換完畢的可轉債皆有作價現象，其中，提前到期的可轉債，作價程度與每股盈餘呈顯著負相關，與現金流量比率、董事會規模、經理人持股比例呈顯著正相關；而未提前到期的可轉債，其作價程度與財務特性無顯著關係，與經理人持股比例、外部董事比例則呈顯著負相關。

This thesis is mainly about whether the company manipulates the stock price to increase the converting ratio of convertible bonds before expiration. Our sample are convertible bonds which were issued from 2006 to 2016 by listed company. All information is from TEJ. There are 548 samples in total. Our research can be divided into two parts. First, we use event study method provided by TEJ to calculate cumulative abnormal returns(CAR). If CAR remains significant for a period of time, it means that the company manipulated the share price. Second, we use regression analysis to find the relationship between CAR and financial characteristics, and the relationship between CAR and corporate governance. Different from past research, our thesis takes the warning announcement into consideration and uses CAR to measure price manipulation. Thus, we find that the company indeed manipulates the stock price to increase the converting ratio. Besides, we also find the CAR is associated with some financial characteristics and corporate governance. Above all, investors can take this phenomenon into consideration and make a profit.

一、英文文獻
1. Ang, J.S., Cole, R.A. and Lin, J.W. Agency Costs and Ownership Structure. Journal of Finance, Vol.55, 81-106, 2000.
2. Bechmann, K. L. Short sales, price pressure, and the stock price response to convertible bond calls. Journal of Financial Markets,7(4),427-451, 2004.
3. Carter, D. A., Simkins, B. J., & Simpson, W. G. Corporate governance, board diversity, and firm value. Financial Review, 38(1): 33-53, 2003.
4. Chaganti, R.S., Mahajan, V., Sharma, S. Corporate board size, composition and corporate failures in retailing industry. Journal of Management Studies, Vol.22, 400-417, 1985.
5. Chung, R., M. Firth and J.B. Kim. Institutional Monitoring and Opportunistic Earning Management. Journal of Corporate Finance, vol.8, 29-48, 2002.
6. Dayton, Kenneth N. Corporate Governance-the Other Side of the Coin. Harvard Business Review, 62(1), 34-37, 1984.
7. DeAngelo, H. L. DeAngelo, and D. J. Skinner. Accounting choice in troubled companies. Journal of Accounting and Economics 17(Jane): 113-143, 1994.
8. Dechow, P. M., Sloan, R. G., & Sweeney, A. P. Causes & consequences of earnings manipulation: An analysis of firms subject to enforcement actions by the SEC. Contemporary Accounting Research, 13(1), 1−36, 1996.
9. DeFond, M. L., and J. Jiambalvo. Debt covenant violation and manipulation of accruals. Journal of Accounting and Economics 17 (January): 145-176, 1994.
10. Ederington, L. H.,J. C. Goh.Is a Convertible Bond Call Really Bad News? Journal of Business,74,459-476, 2001.
11. El-Gazzar, S. M. Predisclosure information and institutional ownership: A cross-sectional examination of market revaluations during earnings announcement periods. The Accounting Review, No.73(January), 119-129, 1998.
12. Fama, E. F. and M. C. Jensen. Separation of ownership and control. Journal of Law and Economics, 26, No.2, 301-324, 1983.
13. Foster, G. Quarterly accounting data: Time-series properties and predicative-ability results. The Accounting Review 52(January): 1-21, 1977.
14. Haniffa, R. and M. Hudaib. Corporate Governance Structure and Performance of Malaysian listed Companies. Journal of Business Finance and Accounting, 33(7-8), 1034-1062, 2006.
15. Hermalin, B. E. and M. Weisbach. The Determinants of Board Composition. RAND Journal of Economic, 19, 589-606, 1987.
16. Hunton, J. E., Libby, R., & Mazza, C. L. Financial reporting transparency & earnings management. The Accounting Review, 81(1), 135−157, 2006.
17. Jensen, M. C., & Meckling, W. H. Theory of the firm: Managerial behavior, agency costs & ownership structure.” Journal of Financial Economics, 3(4), 305−360, 1976.
18. Jensen,M. C. & R. S. Ruback. Market for corporate control: empirical evidence. Journal of Financial Economics, 1:5-50, 1983.
19. Jones, J. J. Earnings management during import relief investigations. Journal of accounting research, Vol. 29 (2), 193-228, 1991.
20. Junttila, Juha, Kallunki, Juha-Pekka, Kärja, Aki, & Martikainen, Minna. Stock market response to analysts' perceptions and earnings in a technology-intensive environment. International review of financial analysis, 14(1), 77-92, 2005.
21. Kao, L., and A. Chen. The effects of board characteristics on earnings management. Corporate Ownership and Control 1(Spring): 96-107, 2004.
22. McLaughlin, R. M., Safieddine, A., & Vasudevan, G. K. The long-run performance of convertible debt issuers. Journal of Financial Research, 21(4), 373-88, 1998.
23. Mikkelson, W. H. Convertible calls and security returns. Journal of Financial Economics, 9(3), 237-265, 1981.
24. Morck, R., A. Shleifer and R.W. Vishny. Management Ownership and Market Valuation: An Empirical Analysis. Journal of Financial Economics, 20:293-316, 1988.
25. Myers, S. C., & Majluf, N. S. Corporate financing and investment decisions when firms have information that investors do not have. Journal of financial economics, 13(2), 187-221, 1984
26. Patton, A., & Baker, J. C. Why won’t directors rock the boat? Harvard Business Review, 65(6), 10−18, 1987.
27. Peasnell, K. V., Pope, P. F., & Young, S. Accrual management to meet earnings targets: UK evidence pre- and post-Cadbury. The British Accounting Review, 32(4), 415-445, 2000.
28. Press, E. G., and J. B. Weintrop. Accounting-based constraints in public and private debt agreements: Their associations with leverage and impact on accounting choice. Journal of Accounting and Economics 12 (January): 65-95, 1990.
29. Rangan, S. Earnings management and the performance of seasoned equity offerings. Journal of Financial Economics 50 (1), 101-122, 1998.
30. Tech, S. H., I. Welch, and T. J. Wong. Earnings management and the long-run market performance of initial public offerings. Journal of Finance 53 (6), 1935-1974, 1998.
31. Urcan, O., & Kieschnick, R. Earnings Management and Convertible Bond Arbitrage. Available at SSRN 817164, 2007.
32. Xie, B., W. N. Davidson and P. J. DaDalt. Earnings Management and Corporate Governance: The Role of the Board and the Audit Committee. Journal of Corporate Finance, Vol. 9, pp. 295-316, 2003.
33. 蔡學蘭，2005，Earnings Management and the Underperformance of Convertible Bond Offerings，國立中正大學財務金融研究所碩士論文。

二、中文文獻
1. 王朝正，2004，股市監視制度：處置效果之探討，國立中央大學財務管理研究所碩士論文。
2. 吳明政、蔡幼群、林佳錡，2006，可轉換公司債宣告贖回對股票報酬影響與成因之探討，企業管理學報，第六十九期，頁135-138。
3. 呂麒麟、向少華，2005。台股機構投資人對經理人盈餘管理影響之研究，朝陽商管評論，第 4 卷第 1 期，1-21。
4. 沈毓玲，2006公司治理特性與盈餘管理之關聯性研究-以IPO公司為例，成功大學會計學系學位論文。
5. 林士韡，2009，公司治理、盈餘管理與可轉換公司債發行後長期績效之研究，國立政治大學會計系碩士論文。
6. 林位餘，2012，國內可轉換公司債之宣告、發行及到期對公司股價影響，南華大學財務管理研究所碩士論文。
7. 林宏錦，2004，台灣股市監視制度有效性之研究，私立真理大學碩士論文。
8. 林育志，2001，轉換公司債發行動機之風險移轉與後門權益假說實證，國立中山大學財務管理研究所碩士論文。
9. 林佩琦，2010，上櫃警示股價量衝擊之研究，私立銘傳大學財務金融學系研究所碩士論文。
10. 林俊廷，2008，高階經理人薪酬計畫、公司治理與盈餘管理，國立東華大學企業管理學系碩士論文。
11. 林春佑，2011，可轉換公司債償債效應與投資策略，私立世新大學財務金融學研究所碩士論文。
12. 林麗冠，2010 ，警示宣告對於個股價量衝擊之研究－以上櫃股票為例，銘傳大學財務金融學系碩士在職專班碩士論文。
13. 凃佩君，2015，公司財務特性對可轉債到期前後股價之影響，國立成功大學，財務金融研究所碩士在職專班論文。
14. 張主卿，1995，警示股價量行為之實證研究，國立政治大學國際貿易研究所碩士論文。
15. 張正中，1998，從預期轉換期間探討宣告與發行可轉換公司債對公司股價的影響-台灣的實證分析，國立政治大學銀行學研究所碩士論文。
16. 郭敏怡，1997，台灣可轉換公司債訊號模式之實證研究，私立元智大學管理研究所碩士論文。
17. 陳怡靜，2012，公司治理與盈餘管理對可轉換公司債之轉換能力的影響，國立交通大學財務金融研究所碩士論文。
18. 陳俐君，2002，財務彈性對可轉換公司債發行公司長期營運績效影響之分析，國立政治大學財務管理研究所碩士論文。
19. 陳家慧，2000，我國上市公司管理機制與盈餘管理相關性之實證研究，國立政治大學會計學系碩士論文。
20. 雲建裳，2007，可轉換公司債發行與盈餘管理，國立中山大學企業管理學系研究所碩士論文。
21. 楊筱瑄，2004，宣告贖回可轉債對股價影響之研究，私立東吳大學企業管理學系所碩士論文。
22. 簡慈慧，1995，注意股票公告前後股價行為之研究，國立中央大學財務管理研究所碩士論文。
三、參考網站
1. 台灣經濟新報資料庫(TEJ) https://www.tej.com.tw/twsite/
2. 台灣證券交易所 http://www.tse.com.tw/zh/