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研究生：	黃郁絜 Huang, Yu-Chieh
論文名稱：	高階經理人聲譽對股東財富的影響：以研發支出增加宣告為例 The Influence of Top Manager's Reputation on The Announcement Effect of R&D Expenditures Increase
指導教授：	張紹基 Chang, Shao-Chi
學位類別：	碩士 Master
系所名稱：	管理學院 - 國際企業研究所 Institute of International Business
論文出版年：	2007
畢業學年度：	95
語文別：	英文
論文頁數：	49
中文關鍵詞：	高階經理人聲譽、研發支出
外文關鍵詞：	CEO reputation, top manager, R&D expenditures
相關次數：	點閱：86 下載：6
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本文根據高層理論(upper echelon theory)探討高階經理人的聲譽與公司增加研發支出之宣告效果間的關係。研發活動(R&D)對企業而言是維持公司成長與競爭力的重要關鍵，但是研發活動存在資訊不對稱的現象，因此企業的財務報表無法提供外部投資者足夠訊息來衡量研發活動的真正價值以及是否對股東有利。因此，外部投資者會尋求一些準則來衡量公司宣告增加研發支出活動的價值。高層理論強調高階經理人的特質會影響公司績效。此外公司的高階經理人有較佳的聲譽時，可以傳遞公司真正價值給外部投資者且降低資訊不對稱的程度。因此當公司宣告增加研發支出時，外部投資者可以藉由觀察高階經理人聲譽之高低來衡量此研發支出活動的價值。因此本研究以1992～2005年美國上市公司有進行宣告增加研發支出之公司作為樣本，經過CRSP、Compustat資料庫之比對，共為264筆樣本。並根據Milbourn (2003)的研究以CEO之任期、CEO為外部任用及CEO任期間的公司績效表現(1、3、5年)作為衡量CEO聲譽高低的三個變數，加以探討高階經理人的聲譽如何影響公司增加研發支出之宣告效果。
經由分析結果得知，除了CEO為外部任用和CEO任期間的公司5年績效表現之影響方向和本研究預期方向不一致外，CEO之任期、CEO任期間的公司1、3年績效表現均符合本研究之預期方向。顯示高階經理人有較高的聲譽時，可增加外部投資者的信心並且給予公司在宣告增加研發支出時正面的股價反應。

This study follows the concept of upper echelon theory to examine the relationship between top manager’s reputation and the announcement effects of R&D expenditures increased. Because R&D activity is associated with information asymmetry, therefore outside investors begin to quest other criteria for assessing the value of R&D activity. The upper echelon theory emphasized that top manager’s characteristics will influence firm’s performance. Besides, a firm with more reputable top manager can convey firm’s intrinsic value to outside investors, and then reduce the extent of information asymmetry. This study follows Milbourn’s study (2003) to use CEO’s tenure, CEO is an outsider and CEO’s firm performance over one, three and five years to be the proxies of CEO’s reputation. And then this study collects 264 R&D announcements from 1992 to 2005 to examine the influence of CEO’s reputation on the announcement effects when a firm announced to increase R&D expenditures.
The empirical results indicate that the proxies of CEO’s tenure and CEO’s firm performance over one and three years have positive effects on R&D announcements except the proxies of CEO is an outsider and CEO’s firm performance over five years. It indicates that if CEO has higher reputation; stock market will give the firm positive reactions when it announced to increase R&D expenditures.

Table of Contents
Chapter 1 Introduction....................................1
1.1 Research background...................................1
1.2 Research motivation and purpose.......................3
Chapter 2 Literature Review and Hypothesis................5
2.1 Research and development activity.....................5
2.2 Top manager’s reputation.............................9
2.3 Hypothesis development...............................17
Chapter 3 Data and Methodology...........................19
3.1 Data and sample selection............................19
3.2 Methodology..........................................21
3.3 Definition and measure of the variables..............26
Chapter 4 Empirical Results..............................32
4.1 Sample description...................................32
4.2 The announcement effects of R&D expenditures increased................................................34
4.3 Test of mean difference on CEO’s reputation.........36
4.4 Cross-sectional regression analysis..................37
Chapter 5 Conclusions....................................41
5.1 Research conclusions.................................41
5.2 Research contributions...............................45
5.3 Research limitations and suggestions.................46
References...............................................47

List of Tables
Table 3-1 Definition of variables and predicted signs....31
Table 4-1 Distribution of R&D expenditure announcements..32
Table 4-2 Descriptive statistics for selected variables..33
Table 4-3 Correlations among selected variables..........34
Table 4-4 Abnormal returns and cumulative average abnormal returns over periods surrounding the announcement........35
Table 4-5 Mean difference test of two-day cumulative average abnormal returns, divided by median of CEO’s tenure, outsider and industry-adjusted firm performance..37
Table 4-6 Cross-sectional regression analysis of the two-day cumulative abnormal returns, independent variables are continuous variables.....................................38
Table 4-7 Cross-sectional regression analysis of the two-day cumulative abnormal returns, independent variables are dummy variables..........................................40
                                    

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校內：2010-06-23公開
校外：2010-06-23公開

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