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研究生: 周柏豪
Chou, Bo-hau
論文名稱: 公平意見於併購時之使用動機
The managerial incentive to use fairness opinions in mergers and acquisitions
指導教授: 陳嬿如
Chen, Yenn-Ru
學位類別: 碩士
Master
系所名稱: 管理學院 - 財務金融研究所
Graduate Institute of Finance
論文出版年: 2013
畢業學年度: 101
語文別: 英文
論文頁數: 40
中文關鍵詞: 公平意見併購大股東經理人薪資
外文關鍵詞: Fairness opinions, mergers and acquisitions, blockholders, CEO compensation
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  • 此篇論文主要探討美國主併公司於併購時使用公平意見之動機。公平意見是由第三方進行併購案時所提供之報告,此報告可提供更詳盡的公司評價資訊於使用者。藉由使用公平意見,公司可以更有效的提升併購成功的可能性及其品質。在決定併購與否的過程中,具有重大影響力的如執行長及大股東將會影響公司的投資決策。執行長及大股東對併購此投資案的立場會被自己所偏好的公司投資風險而影響,而他們的偏好則被自己所擁有的資產影響,進一步的影響公司是否決定使用公平意見於併購案中。此報告中,實證結果進一步的證明執行長及大股東所擁有的資產及財富,包含公司的股票及選擇權,將會與主併公司是否使用公平意見於併購案中,有著重大的關聯性。

    This paper investigates the motivation for acquiring firms to adopt fairness opinions. Fairness opinions are provided by third parties and are used in mergers and acquisitions. Corporations will increase the likelihood of completing the deal and ensure the quality of M&A deals. However, the M&A decision may involve the risk and uncertainty, significantly affecting the wealth of CEOs and blockholders. Since blockholders and CEOs all have the ability to influence corporate decisions, their favor toward the degree of risk in investment activities might have a significant impact on the usage of fairness opinions by acquiring firms. In this study, the empirical results show that CEOs and blockholders have a significant influence on the adoption of fairness opinions due to their concern about the wealth, including stocks and options.

    摘要 I Abstract II 誌謝 III Contents IV List of Tables V Chapter1 Introduction 1 1.1 Research Background and Motivation 1 1.2 Objectives and Major Findings 3 1.3 Importance of this Study 6 1.4 Organization of this Study 7 Chapter 2 Literature Review and Development of Hypotheses 8 2.1 Mergers and acquisitions 8 2.2 Fairness opinions in mergers and acquisitions 8 2.3 The role of blockholders 10 2.4 CEO compensation and agency problem 11 2.5 Hypothesis Development 13 Chapter 3 Data and Methodology 14 3.1 Sample construction 14 3.2 Empirical Model 15 3.3 The measure to estimate the option value 20 Chapter 4 Empirical Results 21 4.1 The Impact of Blockholders on the usage of Fairness Opinions 21 4.2 The Impact of CEO Compensation on the Usage of Fairness Opinions 24 Chapter 5 Conclusions 26 References 29 Appendix A 40

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