本研究以2001至2010年發生盈餘重編之公司為樣本，探討盈餘重編對於CEO股票選擇權薪酬的影響，並以2002年沙賓法案的發布做為區隔。Cheng and Farber (2008)探討沙賓法案前，盈餘重編對於CEO薪酬變動之影響，其發現重編公司會降低CEO的股份基礎薪酬。由於沙賓法案發布後，整體經濟環境特徵產生明顯變化，因此本研究延伸Cheng and Farber (2008)之研究，探討沙賓法案發布前後盈餘重編對於CEO股票選擇權薪酬之影響。
研究結果發現，在沙賓法案發布前，重編公司會降低CEO的股票選擇權薪酬，一方面反映重編公司透過降低股票選擇權薪酬作為對CEO的懲罰，另一方面亦反映重編公司透過降低股票選擇權來降低CEO盈餘操縱的誘因。然而在沙賓法案發布之後，盈餘重編對於CEO股票選擇權薪酬的影響並不顯著，顯示沙賓法案的發布有效地提升公司治理機制與董事會監督能力，進而降低CEO盈餘操縱的機會，因此公司在沙賓法案後較不需要透過降低CEO股票選擇權的方式來降低CEO盈餘操縱的誘因。
制定會計準則及公司制定CEO薪酬合約時，本研究結果能提供參考依據，進而降低財務報導舞弊之發生。

This study examines the influences of earnings restatement on the change in CEO stock-option compensation. Cheng and Farber (2008) investigate similar issue but examine only the period before Sarbanes-Oxley Act (SOX). Since SOX caused significant changes in the overall economic environment, this paper extends Cheng and Farber (2008) by investigating the relation between earnings restatement and CEO stock-option compensation before and after SOX.
Using a sample consisting of firms that restated earnings during 2001 to 2010, we find that earnings restatement significantly reduce CEO stock-option compensation before SOX, whereas the relation between earnings restatement and CEO stock-option compensation becomes insignificant after SOX. We interpret these findings as suggesting that before SOX companies reduce CEO stock-option compensation as a punishment or as a way to reduce CEO’s incentives to manage earnings. Since SOX enhances the strengths of corporate governance and the monitoring functions of board of directors, the concern that stock-option compensation increases CEO’s incentives to manage earnings becomes lower after SOX.
Overall, the results of this study should be of interest to the regulators when setting accounting standards and to the practice when signing CEO compensation contracts.

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