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研究生: 賴盈寰
Lai, Ying-Huan
論文名稱: 為何台灣上市公司會投資風險性金融資產?
Why do Taiwan’s firms invest in risky financial assets?
指導教授: 黃炳勳
Huang, Ping-Hsun
學位類別: 碩士
Master
系所名稱: 管理學院 - 財務金融研究所
Graduate Institute of Finance
論文出版年: 2019
畢業學年度: 107
語文別: 英文
論文頁數: 32
中文關鍵詞: 融資限制預防性動機代理問題公司治理過度自信
外文關鍵詞: Financial constraints, precautionary motive, agency problem, corporate governance, overconfidence
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  • 台灣的上市公司經常投資於風險性金融資產,例如股票、公司債和不動產抵押貸款證券,因此,本文欲探討在台灣的公司決定投資風險性金融資產的因素為何。研究所使用樣本來自台灣非金融業上市公司,樣本總數為4140個。研究結果指出公司的風險性金融資產隨著公司金融資產增加而上升。此外,公司規模和淨營運資金與公司的風險性金融資產為正相關,且公司市價淨值比與風險性金融資產規模為負相關,皆表示非融資受限公司相較於融資受限公司持有更多的風險性金融資產。然而,本研究並未發現管理者動機可以解釋公司對於風險性金融資產的決策。

    Taiwan’s companies often invest in risky financial assets such as stocks, corporate bonds, and mortgage-backed securities. This paper examines the determinants of corporate investments in risky financial assets by using a sample of 4140 nonfinancial firm-years in Taiwan. I find that a firm’s investment in risky assets increases with its financial portfolio. Further, firm size and net working capital are positively associated with a firm’s investment in risky securities, whereas market-to-book ratio is inversely related to the level of investment in risky financial assets. These results imply that financially unconstrained firms hold more risky financial assets than financially constrained firms. However, I do not find that managerial motives explain a firm’s decision to invest in risky securities.

    摘要.....................................................i Abstract................................................ii 誌謝....................................................iii Contents................................................iv LIST OF TABLES..........................................v CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION.................................1 CHAPTER 2: LITERATURE AND HYPOTHESES....................3 2.1 Financial constraints...............................3 2.2 Agency problem......................................8 2.5 Overconfidence......................................9 CHAPTER 3: DATA, KEY VARIABLES, AND METHODOLOGY.........10 3.1 Data selection......................................10 3.2 Asset Classification................................10 3.3 Dependent variables.................................11 3.4 Independent variables...............................11 3.5 Methodology.........................................15 3.6 Descriptive statistics..............................16 CHAPTER 4: EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS...........................19 4.1 Financial constraints...............................19 4.2 Dose agency problem affect risky financial investments? ........................................................22 4.3 Does an overconfident manager invest more in risky financial assets?.......................................26 CHAPTER 5 CONCLUSION....................................27 REFERENCE...............................................29

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