機場問題探討數家航空公司合作建造飛機跑道，跑道成本應如何分攤。本篇文章探討跑道成本分配的法則：核心解(the core)，我們利用 Peleg (1986) 所提出的公設來刻劃核心解並討論公設的獨立性。

We consider the “airport problem”, which is concerned with sharing the cost of an airstrip among several airlines. The core is an allocation rule for airport problems. We characterize it by the axioms proposed by Peleg (1986).We also show that the axioms used in the characterization of the core are independent.

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