本論文建構三方非對稱演化博弈模型，探討台灣雙軌碳市場下政府、大排放源與小排放源之策略互動。研究以台灣2026年碳費制度為背景，將強制性碳費制度與自願性減量市場納入同一分析架構，透過解析推導與數值模擬獲得兩項核心發現：其一，系統雖可收斂至政府積極監管、大排放源低碳轉型、小排放源參與自願減量之社會最適均衡，惟此一均衡主要由聲譽機制與供應鏈誘因驅動，而非單純依靠碳費費率調整；其二，小排放源之參與存在可解析求得之條件式門檻——在政府積極監管下，大排放源低碳轉型機率約超過2.5%時，小排放源之參與收益即由負轉正。此門檻數值甚低，顯示在現行制度參數下，「以大帶小」機制之啟動條件相對容易滿足；政策重點因此不在於跨越門檻本身，而在於維持門檻成立所依賴之供應鏈收益、聲譽機制等結構性條件，並使門檻跨越後的參與誘因轉化為實際擴散。
模型以監管成本、碳費費率、聲譽損失、減碳技術成本、MRV成本與供應鏈收益等參數進行敏感度分析，辨識各參數之角色差異：減碳技術成本、企業聲譽損失、供應鏈收益與環境效益屬決定均衡方向之關鍵參數，並各自存在可量化之反轉閾值；碳費費率與MRV成本等則屬低敏感參數，其變動主要影響收斂速度而非最終方向。
政策意涵上，本研究建議台灣應優先降低大排放源之低碳轉型技術成本、強化強制性碳揭露與聲譽機制，並支持大型排放源帶動供應鏈轉型；MRV成本經重新校準後屬低敏感參數，降低查驗成本雖有助於減輕中小企業行政負擔，惟不宜作為主要政策槓桿。本研究之貢獻有三：理論上，將強制性碳費與自願性減量市場整合為政府—大排放源—小排放源之三方非對稱演化賽局，並推導小排放源參與門檻之封閉解；實務上，以台灣2026年碳費制度參數完成此一雙軌制度之演化賽局量化校準，提供各關鍵參數之反轉閾值；政策上，據此為《氣候變遷因應法》下之差別化碳費設計、供應鏈減碳政策與中小企業低碳轉型提供量化參考。

This thesis develops a three-party asymmetric evolutionary game model to examine the strategic interactions among the government, large emitters, and small emitters under Taiwan’s dual-track carbon market. Based on Taiwan’s 2026 carbon fee framework, this study integrates the mandatory carbon fee system and the voluntary emission reduction market, and uses numerical simulations to analyze how regulatory costs, carbon fee rates, reputational losses, abatement technology costs, MRV costs, and supply-chain benefits affect evolutionary outcomes.
The results show that the system can converge to the socially optimal equilibrium of active regulation, low-carbon transition, and voluntary participation. However, this outcome is driven mainly by reputational mechanisms and supply-chain incentives rather than carbon fee adjustments alone. Small emitter participation is activated only when the transition probability of large emitters exceeds the critical threshold of 2.5%, highlighting the key role of large lead firms in supply-chain decarbonization. Given that this threshold is low under current institutional parameters, the policy focus should shift from crossing the threshold to sustaining the structural conditions—supply-chain revenues and reputational mechanisms—on which it rests.
This study suggests that Taiwan should prioritize reducing abatement technology costs, strengthen mandatory carbon disclosure and reputational mechanisms, and support large emitters in driving supply-chain transition; MRV costs, recalibrated as a low-sensitivity parameter, should not serve as a primary policy lever. The findings provide quantitative references for differentiated carbon fee design, supply-chain decarbonization policies, and SME low-carbon transition under Taiwan’s Climate Change Response Act.
The contributions are threefold: a unified three-party asymmetric evolutionary game integrating mandatory carbon fees with a voluntary reduction market, including a closed-form participation threshold; the first game-theoretic quantitative calibration of Taiwan's 2026 dual-track carbon fee system; and quantitative benchmarks for differentiated carbon fee design and SME low-carbon transition policies.

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