本文主要在探討公司治理對現金持有水準的影響，首先分析所有台灣上市公司的現金持有量會被哪些公司治理變數顯著影響，並進一步將台灣的上市公司依據不同的現金持有比率劃分為三個區間，分別代表低額現金持有水準、中度現金持有水準及高額現金持有水準，並進行相關的比較與分析；用以協助不同現金持有水準的業者了解會顯著影響其公司的公司治理變數與相關的營運特性，並進行更加妥善完備的現金管理決策。
本研究發現，在台灣的上市公司中，董事會規模越大，代表董事會運作效率越高會更有效的運用現金，外國法人持股越多，代表外部監督壓力越強，董監事股權質押比率越高，代表董監事自利動機提升或認為公司現階段沒有適當的投資計畫，上述三個公司治理變數皆會造成公司的現金持有水準會顯著的降低；接著，將上市公司分群比較後，進一步發現，低額現金持有水準的公司，投資最多非本業的金融資產、舉債水準也是最高的、大股東持股最多、董監事股權質押比率最高，而此類公司在有董事長兼任總經理的情況，代表董事長自利動機較強會利用公司的現金優先極大化個人財富，外國法人持股比率越高，則代表公司的外部監督壓力越強，經理人持股比率越高時，代表經理人財富與股東財富連結性越強，以上變數皆會造成現金持有水準顯著降低，但在董監事股權質押比率越高時，代表董監事自利動機較強或對公司前景不看好，此時現金持有水準則會顯著升高。在中度現金持有公司中，此類公司的規模最大、營業收入淨額最高、董事會規模也最大，而此類公司在大股東持股比率提升、具有高董監事持股水準(董監事持股25%以上)時，代表公司的內部監督力道提升且董事會對公司有信心，此時公司的現金持有水準會顯著下降。在高額現金持有公司中，此類公司的市帳值比最高、現金流量比率最高、資本支出最大、流動性資產最充足、研發費用支出最高，經理人持股最多、外國法人持股也最多，而此類公司在董事會規模擴大時，代表公司運作效率越高，董監事股權質押比率越高時，代表現階段尚無適當的投資計畫，此時公司現金持有水準皆會顯著降低，但當經理人及外國法人持股比率越高時，代表經理人財富與股東財富連結性較強且外國法人監督力更大，此時決策高層會較謹慎的增加持有現金等待事當的投資機會，則現金持有水準會顯著提升。

This paper mainly discusses the impact of corporate governance on the level of cash holdings. First, we analyze which corporate governance variables affect the cash holdings of all Taiwan listed companies, and further divides Taiwan’s listed companies into three based on different cash holding ratios. These ranges represent low cash holdings, medium cash holdings, and high cash holdings, to help businesses with different cash holdings understand the variables that will significantly affect the company’s corporate governance and related operating characteristics. The empirical results of this study can enable companies to make more appropriate and complete cash management decisions.

國內文獻
1. 蘇玄啟、羅仙法、施懿宸、李汶育(2014)，台灣上市公司的現金持有、現金持有價值與公司生命週期:預防性動機假說之驗證，臺大管理論叢的26卷的二期:173-210。
2. 李馨蘋、莊宗憲(2007)，公司治理與公司績效之實證研究，東吳經紀商學學報第五十七期:1-27。
3. 雲國華(2007)，公司治理與現金持有關聯之研究-台灣上市公司之實證。私立中原大學國際貿易貿易系未出版碩士論文。
4. 李智蕙(2008)，現金持有率、公司價值與公司治理之關聯性-台灣上市櫃公司實證研究。國立政治大學會計系未出版碩士論文。
5. 張大成、薛人瑞、黃建隆（2003），財務危機模型之變數選取研究，貨幣觀測與信用評等，第39期，頁96-105
6. 洪榮華陳香如與王玉珍(2005)，公司內部治理機制與公司績效之關係－股權結構與董事會特性的觀點，輔仁管理評論 ； 12卷3期， P23 - 40
7. 李馨平與莊忠憲(2007)，公司治理機制與公司績效之實證研究，東吳經濟學學報第五十七期:1-27
8. 高蘭芬(2002)，董監事股權質押之代理問題對會計資訊與公司績效之影響，國立成功大學會計學研究所博士論文
9. 李馨蘋與黃啟倫(2009)，股權結構、關係人交易與公司績效，中華管理評論國際學報，第12卷第二期
10. 黃資東(2009)，董事會特性、股權結構與公司經營績效之關聯性研究—以台灣電子產業上市公司為例，國立臺北大學國際財務金融碩士在職專班未出版論文。
11. 張雅琳，2004，我國企業獨立董事機制與經營績效之關聯性研究，大葉大學會計資訊研究所未出版碩士論文。
12. 沈立平(2003)，台灣上市公司股權結構、財務決策與公司價值之關聯性研究，國立中正大學企業管理研究所未出版碩士論文。
13. 菜柳卿、邵珮雯與楊怡芳(2008)，公司治理對代理成本與無形資產之影響，中華管理評論國際學報，第十一卷四期
14. 江淑貞、劉維琪、張玉山(2005)，「公司初次上市承銷方式、股權分配與監督機制」，臺大管理論叢，15卷2期：1-24
15. 洪昕琳(2006)，董監事質押與持股比率對財務危機之影響－以台灣上市公司為例，朝陽科技大學財務金融系碩士論文。
16. 陳安琳、高蘭芬、陳怡凱、陳皖鈺(2013)，董監事股權質押與公司治理之研究，中山管理評論第二十一卷第二期 p.299-337
17. 俞海琴與周本鄂(1994)，臺灣地區上市公司董監事、關係人持股比率和公司托賓Q關係之研究，管理評論，13卷1期:P79-98。
18. 陳英豪，(2013)，台灣上市公司的機構法人持股對於現金持有與現金持有價值的影響，國立高雄第一科技大學財務管理所碩士學位論文。
19. 王玉珍，2002，股權結構、董事會組成、資本結構與企業績效關係之研究，中央大學企業管理研究所碩士論文。
20. 黃健銘、蘇欣玫、李彥賢(2009)，「企業內部監督與信用風險之關聯性研究」，企業管理學報，第83期，頁1-32。
21. 吳琮璠、黃娟娟(2009)，「公司治理機制是否影響會計師查核意見？」，企業管理學報，第83期，頁65-98。

國外文獻
1. Almazan, A., Hartzell, J., and Starks, L., 2005, “Active Institutional Shareholders and Costs of Monitoring: Evidence from Executive Compensation” Financial Management, Volume 34, Issue 4
Pages: 5-162
2. Ambarish R., K.John ,J. Williams (1987), The journal of Finance,
Volume 42, Issue 2 Pages: i-vi, 201-481, vii-xviii
3. Bacon, J. (1973), Corporate Directorship Practices: Membership and Committees of The Board, New York: The Conference Board.
4. Baskin, J. (1987), ‘Corporate Liquidity in Games of Monopoly Power’, Review of Economics and Statistics, Vol. 69, pp. 312–19.
5. Brickley, Lease and Smith(1988).Ownership Structure and Voting on Antitakeover Amendments, Journal of Financial Economics 20(1-2):267-291
6. Chiang Kao and Shiang-Tai Liu (2004), Predicting bank performance with financial forecasts: A case of Taiwan commercial banks, Journal of Banking & Finance, ISSN: 0378-4266, Vol: 28, Issue: 10, Page: 2353-2368
7. Chien-min Kevin Pan (2006). Operating Performance Japanese Firms Large Cash Of with Holdings During Bubble Economy.The Journal of Management Accounting, Japan: Supplement,75-99
8. Daily, C. and Dalton, D. (1993) Board of Directors Leadership and Structure: Control and Performance Implications. Journal of Financial Economics, 1, 55-64.
9. Dittmar, A.,J.Mahrt-Smith and H. Servaes (2003).International Corporate Governance and Corporate Cash Holdings.Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis,Vol.38,pp.111–33.
10. Dittmar, Amy and Jan Mahrt-Smith, 2007, Corporate governance and the value of cash holdings, Journal of Financial Economics 83 (3), 599-634.
11. Fenn, G. W. and Liang, N., 2001, “Corporate payout policy and managerial stock incentives,” Journal of Financial Economics, Vol. 60, No. 1, 45-72.
12. Fama, Eugene F. and Jensen, Michael C., Separation of Ownership and Control. Michael C. Jensen, FOUNDATIONS OF ORGANIZATIONAL STRATEGY, Harvard University Press, 1998, and Journal of Law and Economics, Vol. 26, June 1983.
13. Ferreira, M. A., &A. S.Vilela, (2004),“Why do firms hold cash? evidence from EMU countries,” European Financial Management, 10(2), pp.295-319.
14. Gertner, R. and D. Scharfstein (1991).“A Theory of Workouts and the Effects of Reorganization Law,” Journal of Finance,46, pp. 1189-1222.
15. Harford,J.(1999).Corporate cash reserves and acquisitions. Journal of Finance,Vol.54,pp.1969-1977.
16. John (1993).Top‐Management Compensation and Capital Structure. The Journal of Finance Vol.48,No.3,pp.949-974
17. Jensen, M.C. and W.H. Meckling(1976),Theory of the Firm: Management Behavior , Agency Costs and Ownership Structure ,Journal of Financial Economics, 3:305-360.
18. Jensen, M. C. (1986), ‘Agency Costs of Free Cash Flow, Corporate Finance and Takeovers’, American Economic Review, Vol. 76, pp. 323–39.
19. Jensen, M. C., & Ruback, R. S. (1983). The market for corporate control: The scientific evidence. Journal of Financial Economics, 11, 5-50.
20. Klaus Gugler & B.Burcin Yurtoglu (2003), Corporate governance and dividend pay-out policy in Germany, European Economic Review, ISSN: 0014-2921, Vol: 47, Issue: 4, Page: 731-758
21. Keynes, John M., 1936, The general theory of employment, interest and money, Harcourt Brace, London.
22. Kim, C., D. C.Mauer, & A. E. Sherman, (1998),“The determinants of corporate liquidity: Theory and evidence,” Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis,33(3), pp.335-359.
23. Morck, Randall, Andrei Shleifer, and Robert W Vishny(1988). “Management Ownership and Market Valuation: An Empirical Analysis.” Journal of Financial Economics 20 (1-2): 293-315.
24. Mikkelson, W. H., and M. M. Partch, 2003.Do persistent large cash reserves hinder performance? Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis, 38, 275-294.
25. Myers, S. C., and N. S. Majluf, 1984,“Corporate financing and investment decisions when firms have information the investors do not have, ”Journal of Financial Economics, 13, 187-221.
26. McConnell, J.J. and Servaes, H. (1990) Additional Evidence on Equity Ownership and Corporate Value. Journal of Financial Economics, 27, 595-612.
27. Merton Miller and Daniel Orr(1966). A Model of the Demand for Money by Firms, The Quarterly Journal of Economics, 80, (3), 413-435
28. Opler, Tim, Lee Pinkowitz, René Stulz, and Rohan Williamson, 1999, The determinants and implications of corporate cash holdings, Journal of Financial Economics 52 (1), 3-46.Mikkelson and Partch (2003).The Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis Vol.38,No.2,pp. 275-294
29. Ozkan, A. and N. Ozkan (2004), ‘Corporate Cash Holdings: An Empirical Investigation of UK Companies’, Journal of Banking and Finance, Vol. 28, pp. 2103–34.
30. Pinlowitz L.,Stuiz R. and Williamson R.(2004), Does the Contribution of Corporate Cash Holdings and Dividends to Firm Value Depend on Governance? A Cross-country Analysis ,The Journal of Finance, Volume 61, Issue 6 Pages: i-v, 2551-3110, vi-x
31. Pound,J.(1988).“Proxy Contests and the Efficiency of Shareholder Oversight”, Journal of Financial Economics, 20(9): 237-265.
32. Patton, A. and Baker, J. (1987). Why do not directors rock the boat?. Harvard Business Review, 65, 10-12.
33. Rozeff, M. S., 1982, “Growth, beta and agency costs as determinants of dividend payout ratios,” Journal of Financial Research, Vol. 5, No. 3, 249-259.
34. Rosenstein, S. and Jeffrey G. Wyatt, (1997), Inside directors, board effectiveness, and shareholder wealth, Journal of Financial Economics, 44, (2), 229-250
35. Sabri Boubaker, Imen Derouiche, Duc Khuong Nguyen. Does the board of directors affect cash holdings? A study of French listed firms. Journal of Management and Governance, Springer Verlag (Germany), 2013, 19 (2), pp.341-370.
36. Stulz, R. (1988), Managerial control of voting rights: Financing policies and the market for corporate control. Journal of financial Economics 20, 25-54.
37. Shleifer, Andrei and Robert W. Vishny, 1986, Large shareholders and corporate control, Journal of Political Economy 94 (3), 461-487.
38. White, L. F., 1996, “Executive compensation and dividend policy,” Journal of Corporate Finance, Vol. 2, No. 4, 335-358.
39. Wruck,K.H.(1990).Financial Distress, Reorganization, and Organizational Efficiency. Journal of Financial Economics 27(2): 419-444.
40. Yermack, David, 1996, Higher market valuation of companies with a small board of directors, Journal of Financial Economics 40 (2), 185-211.