「肥貓」係指那些企業績效表現差，卻仍領取高額薪酬之企業高階管理人員及董監事。為了抑止「肥貓」現象，我國證交法規定國內上市櫃公司在民國100年底前均應設置薪酬委員會。
本篇研究旨在檢視國內薪酬委員會設置之有效性。由於薪酬委員會之設置僅有一年，本研究探討是否抑制平均董監事薪酬及超額董監事薪酬的效果會在一些被證交所點名為「肥貓」的上市櫃公司反應，因此本研究樣本僅包括被證交所點名，公布在公開資訊觀測站上，年度稅後虧損惟董監事酬金總額或平均每位董監事酬金卻增加之上市櫃公司的董監事薪酬資料。本研究預期這些被點名的公司在民國100年，即強制設置薪酬委員會年度，董監事薪酬發放會顯著減少；另外，本研究也預期這些被點名的公司其董監事超額薪酬部分會因為薪酬委員會的設立，有下降之趨勢。到目前為止，薪酬委員會之設立僅有一年，本文是我國最早針對此一議題進行探討並提供初步實證證據的研究之一。
本研究結果顯示每位董監事之平均薪酬並未如預期般得到顯著負向，反之為正向未顯著。另外，本研究發現這些被點名公司的董監事超額薪酬，在加計兼任員工酬金部分，於民國100年有下降之趨勢。本篇研究對於探討國內薪酬委員會設置之有效性，提供初步證據以供主管機關及對此議題關心的實務界人士參考。

“Fat Cat” denotes those top executives, directors and supervisors who receive high compensation even though the corporate performance is poor. To address the issue of “Fat Cat”, Financial Supervisory Commission (FSC) in Taiwan requires all listed companies including firms traded in the Taiwan Stock Exchange (TSE) and OTC companies to set up the compensation committee by December 31, 2011. In this study, we used the empirical model from Core, Holthausen, and Laker (1999) to examine the relationship between the director and supervisor compensation payment and the establishment of the compensation committee in Taiwan. From the result, we do not find the average amount of director and supervisor compensation decreased after 2011 when compensation committee was built. By contrast, we find that the director and supervisor excess compensation of these companies significantly decreased after 2011.

一、 中文部分：
朱珊慧(2009)，薪酬委員會於我國董事報酬決定法制之省思。
徐翠梅(2002)，《公司董監在企業監控問題中職務角色之研究》，國立中山大學管理學院高階經營碩士學程專班未出版碩士論文。
陳雯惠(2010)，《董事會資本、董監酬勞與溢領薪酬現像關係之探討－以金融保險為例》，國立成功大學會計研究所未出版碩士論文
廖益均(2013)，《我國薪酬委員會設置現況概述》，貨幣觀測與信用評等，99，057-064
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