本文以2014年至2016年台灣上市上櫃公司之共計約4,539個觀察樣本數為研究對象，探討內部人持股比例以及代理成本對公司經營績效之影響。內部人定義係以董事、監察人、經理人以及大股東之持股比為內部人之計算，代理成本之變數係以總資產周轉率及營業費用率為變數衡量，採用回歸分析以驗證對公司經營績效-股東權益報酬率(ROE)以及公司價值(Tobin's Q)之影響。實證結果發現內部人持股比例對經營績效呈顯著之正向關聯性，而代理成本中總資產周轉率與經營績效呈正向顯著關聯性，營業費用率則未支持本研究假說。結果顯示，企業在內部人持股具有一定比例之程度下，較有誘因替公司創造較高的獲利能力，以創造更佳的經營績效，進一步達到保障股東權益的目的。

A total amount of 4,539 samples, collected during 2014 to 2016 by Taiwan listed companies, are listed as research subjects in this article. This research also explores the influences between shareholders of insiders and agency cost toward the performance of corporate management. In these two different factors affecting the corporate performance, some important variables are adopted to measure the effect. In the first part, the shareholding ratio of directors, supervisors, managers and major shareholders would be taken as calculating index of insiders. In the second part, turnovers of total assets and operating expense ratio are used as variables in measuring agency cost. Finally, regression analysis is adopted to verify the influences between the performance of business (Return on Equity) and the value of enterprise (Tobin’s Q). The result of the verifications reveals that one of the factors, shareholding ratio of insiders, is approximately positive-correlated toward the corporate performance as the operating expense ratio is not supportive in this research. In general, there will be more incentives for insiders to engage in advantageous decision making activities, which optimize business operation, leading a better performance of corporate and a stronger protection of shareholders.

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