此研究的目的為檢視創新決策的長期表現。此外，本研究也檢視紅利與經理人獎酬的財富誘因是否可以解釋創新決策的異常報酬。本研究的創新包含兩個種類：新產品與改善的產品。本研究結果指出紅利與經理人獎酬的財富誘因無法解釋創新宣告的長期表現。本研究也探討獎酬的使用與新產品與改善產品宣告長期績效的關係。有兩點值得注意的：首先，紅利的使用不足以增加經理人風險承擔來採取可挹注報酬的創新投資。第二點，雖然經理人獎酬的使用不能激勵開創新性的產品，但能激勵經理人做現有產品或服務的改善。此結果與Carpenter (2000) and Ross (2004)兩位學者的結果相同。他們提到誘因的財富效果決定風險承擔的等級，不同的風險承擔能力會導致不同的程度的創新投資，本研究實證隱含雖然紅利誘因的財富效果是無法激勵任何新產品及改善產品的投資，然而，經理人獎酬的財富效果可以激勵投資改善產品但無法激勵創新的投資。

This study is written with the aim of examining the post-announcement performance of innovation decisions. In addition, our study offers whether wealth incentive of bonus and ESOs could explain long-term performance of innovation that responds to risk-taking induced from compensations. We include two kinds of innovation decisions: emergence of new products (exploratory innovation) and improved products (exploitative innovation). Our results indicate that the wealth incentive of ESOs could not explain the long-term performance of innovations announcement. Besides, we investigated the relationship between use of compensations and long-term performance of announcement of new product and improved product. Our finding mentions two views: first, the use of bonuses is not sufficient to increase risk-taking of executives to undertake innovations investment that yield abnormal return; secondly, the use of ESOs is not enough to increase risk-taking willingness of provoking a groundbreaking innovation but only to stimulate executives to undertake little changes on their existing products or services. This result is close to empirical evidence provided by Carpenter (2000) and Ross (2004). They mention wealth effect of incentive decides risk-taking level and with different risk-taking level will result in different level of innovations. Our empirical result implies that although wealth effect of incentive neither stimulate new product nor improved product innovations. However, wealth incentive of ESOs could encourage executives to undertake exploitative but not exploratory innovation.

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