本文探討當技術創新競爭發生時，對於企業的投資決策、管理者裁量權與公司最佳資本結構的影響，以Andrikopoulos (2009)的模型為架構，加入跳躍因子推導模型，希望可以看到經理人的保留收入、薪酬和所有權在技術創新競爭之下對投資時機、最佳資本結構、收益率差和債務代理成本的影響。我們找到以下結論：如果技術創新競爭存在，當經理人有高保留收入、低固定薪水以及低股東所有權時，經理人的投資選擇權價值會下降。因此，當經理人有低保留收入、高固定薪水以及高股東所有權時，會建議公司降低其最佳槓桿比率。

This article explores the impact of technological innovation competition on investment decisions, managers' discretion and the company's optimal capital structure when technological innovation occurs. Based on the model of Andrikopoulos (2009), a jump factor derivation model is added. The impact of reservation income, compensation, and ownership shares under technological innovation on investment timing, optimal capital structure, yield spreads, and debt agency costs. We reach the following conclusions: If there is no technology innovations effect, the result is same as previous literature Andrikopoulos (2009). If there is technology innovations effect, when the manager has high reservation income, low salary and low ownership shares, the option value will decline more after adding jump effect. Hence, if the manager’s reservation income is low, salary is high and ownership share is high, we recommend the company to have lower leverage ratio.

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