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研究生：	陳冠延 Chen, Guan-Yan
論文名稱：	反併購條款對公司的影響 Two Essays on the Effect of Antitakeover Provisions on Firm
指導教授：	黎明淵 Li, Ming-Yuan
學位類別：	碩士 Master
系所名稱：	管理學院 - 財務金融研究所 Graduate Institute of Finance
論文出版年：	2010
畢業學年度：	98
語文別：	英文
論文頁數：	65
中文關鍵詞：	反併購條款、盈餘、總風險、系統性風險、非系統性風險
外文關鍵詞：	antitakeover provisions, earnings, total risk, systematic risk, firm-specific risk
相關次數：	點閱：164 下載：0
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在第一篇論文中，我們研究反併購條款與公司盈餘(以ROA為例)的關係。我們採用公司治理指數(G-index)來當作公司反併購條款的指數，如果公司採取越多的反併購條款，則公司的G-index會越高。我們認為一間反併購條款指數越高的公司，提供經理人越多的保護。我們使用OLS檢定以及分量迴歸模型來檢測此關係，在OLS檢定中，我們發現G-index對於盈餘的影響為負向並且顯著。因為採取反併購條款，經理人會脫離來自於併購市場中的競爭，且經營階層可能會減少動力去改善公司營運而因此降低盈餘。在分量迴歸模型中，G-index與公司的盈餘有顯著的負向關係，此與OLS檢定的結果一致。此外我們發現當公司盈餘極端的高或低時，其G-index係數的絕對值會大於公司盈餘在中間階段的G-index係數的絕對值，從此結果，我們發現採取反併購條款的負向效果，在成長以及衰退階段的公司會大於在成熟階段的公司。
在第二篇論文中，我們研究反併購條款與風險的關係，我們將風險分成兩部分，系統性風險以及非系統性風險。在OLS檢定中，我們發現有較高G-index的公司會有較高的系統性風險。我們推測可能是因為缺乏併購的威脅，造成經理人減少誘因去節省成本、增加效率以及投資長期計畫等等。而G-index與非系統性風險有負向關係，但是不顯著。最後G-index與總風險在10%的信賴區間有顯著地正向關係，此與其他兩類型風險結果一致。如果公司用越多的反併購條款，經理人會擁有會越多保護，他們會脫離來自於併購市場中的競爭並且可能會減少動力去改善營運而因此增加總風險

In first essay, we study the relationship between antitakeover provisions and earnings (ROA). We adopt the “Governance Index” (G-index), an index of a firm’s antitakeover provisions - the IRRC index used by Gompers, Ishii, and Metrick (2003). If a firm takes more antitakeover provisions, the G-index of the firm will be higher. We consider a firm with a higher G-index to offer more protection to managers. We use an OLS test and the Quantile Regression Model to exam the relationships. By using an OLS test, we determined that the impact of the G-index on earnings is negative and significant. Because of the adoption of antitakeover provisions, managers are isolated from competition from takeover markets, and management may be less motivated to improve firm operation and thus may decrease earnings. With a Quantile Regression Model, the G-index has a significantly negative relationship with the earnings of firms, which is identical to the results of the OLS. Moreover, we find that if the earnings are extremely high or low, the absolute coefficient of the G-index will be larger than for firms in more moderate earnings situations. From this result, we indicate that the negative effect of adoption of antitakeover provisions for firms in growth and decline stages is greater than it is for firms in mature stages of growth.
In second essay, we study the relationship between antitakeover provisions and risk, decomposing risk into two parts: systematic risk and firm-specific risk. By using an OLS test to exam the relationship, we find that a firm with higher G-index will cause larger systematic risk. We suggest this might be due to a lack of threat regarding takeover, resulting in managers having decreased incentives for cutting costs, increasing efficiency, and investing in long term project. However, the results show a positive relationship between the G-index and firm-specific risk, but it is not significant. Finally, the G-index has a significantly positive relationship with total risk at a 10% level, which is the same result as is demonstrated with the other two types of risk. If firms utilize more antitakeover provisions, managers will have more protection as a result of these provisions; they will be isolated from competition from the takeover market, and they may lose motivation to improve firm operations, thus increasing total risk.

Essay 1: Antitakeover Provisions and Firm Earnings 1 
1. Introduction 1 
2. Literature Review 4 
3. Data and Methodology 10 
3.1 Data and definitions of variables 10 
3.2 The OLS model (non-quantile system) 11 
3.3 The quantile regression approach (The QR model) 13 
4. Empirical results 15 
4.1 Descriptive statistics 15 
4.2 Empirical results 15 
5. Robustness tests 19 
5.1 Model without control variables 19 
5.2 Sub-periods analysis 19 
5.3 Pure cross data 20 
6. Conclusions 21 
Reference 23 
Essay 2: Antitakeover Provisions and Firm Risk 39 
1. Introduction 39 
2. Literature Review 43 
3. Data and Methodology 46 
3.1 Data and definitions of variables 46 
3.2 Calculation of risk 48 
3.3 Regression specification 49 
4. Empirical results 51 
4.1 Descriptive statistics 51 
4.2 Empirical results 52 
5. Robustness tests 54 
5.1 Model without control variables 54 
5.2 Sub-periods analysis 54 
5.3 Pure cross data 55 
6. Conclusions 56 
Reference 57 

List of Tables 
Table 1 Summary of prior literature 25 
Table 2 Definition of dependent/independent variables 26 
Table 3 Descriptive statistics of dependent/independent variables 26 
Table 4 Estimates of the fixed effects models 27 
Table 5 Impact of antitakeover provisions on firm earnings (ROA) across various quantile levels 27 
Table 6 Impact of debt ratio on firm earnings (ROA) across various quantile levels 28 
Table 7 Impact of firm size on firm earnings (ROA) across various quantile levels 29 
Table 8 Impact of liquidity ratio on firm earnings (ROA) across various quantile levels 30 
Table 9 Impact of antitakeover provisions on firm earnings (ROA) across various quantile levels from 1990 to 1998 31 
Table 10 Impact of antitakeover provisions on firm earnings (ROA) across various quantile levels from 2000 to 2006 32 
Table 11 Impact of antitakeover provisions on firm earnings (ROA) across various quantile levels from 2006 33 

List of Figures 
Figure 1 Impact of antitakeover provisions on return on assets (ROA): QR estimates with 95% confidence intervals versus OLS estimate 34 
Figure 2 Impact of antitakeover provisions on return on assets (ROA): QR estimates without 95% confidence intervals versus OLS estimate 34 
Figure 3 Impact of debt ratio on return on assets (ROA): QR estimates with 95% confidence intervals versus OLS estimate 35 
Figure 4 Impact of firm size on return on assets (ROA): QR estimates with 95% confidence intervals versus OLS estimate 35 
Figure 5 Impact of liquidity ratio on return on assets (ROA): QR estimates with 95% confidence intervals versus OLS estimate 36 
Figure 6 Impact of antitakeover provisions on return on assets (ROA) without control variables: QR estimates with 95% confidence intervals versus OLS estimate 36 
Figure 7 Impact of antitakeover provisions on return on assets (ROA) from 1990 to 1998: QR estimates with 95% confidence intervals versus OLS estimate 37 
Figure 8 Impact of antitakeover provisions on return on assets (ROA) from 2000 to 2006: QR estimates with 95% confidence intervals versus OLS estimate 37 
Figure 9 Impact of antitakeover provisions on return on assets (ROA) from 2006: QR estimates with 95% confidence intervals versus OLS estimate 38 

List of Tables 
Table 1 Summary of prior literature 60 
Table 2 Definition of dependent/independent variables 61 
Table 3 Descriptive statistics of dependent/independent variables 62 
Table 4 Estimates of the fixed effects models 63 
Table 5 Estimates of the fixed effects models without control variables 63 
Table 6 Estimates of the fixed effects models from 1990 to 1998 64 
Table 7 Estimates of the fixed effects models from 2000 to 2006 64 
Table 8 Estimates of the fixed effects models from 2006 65 

                                    

Essay 1: Antitakeover Provisions and Firm Earnings

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Essay 2: Antitakeover Provisions and Firm Risk

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