本研究旨在探討獨立董事任期與財務報表品質之關聯性。獨立董事任期長短一直是學術界與主管機關廣泛討論與關注的議題，長任期通常被認為有助於持續累積專業知識與產業經驗，從而提升監督能力。然而，若任期過長，可能因與管理階層建立過於密切之互動關係，導致其獨立性受損，進而削弱監督功能。本文透過Jones模型估計裁決性應計數規模，並以2013年至2024年之台灣非金融類上市櫃公司為樣本進行迴歸分析。實證結果顯示，當獨立董事任期越長，有助於抑制管理階層盈餘管理行為，表示財務報表品質越高。本研究亦發現當內部董事占董事會比例較高時，獨立董事任期越長，其對抑制盈餘管理之效果更明顯，進一步突顯獨立董事在董事會中扮演的重要角色。

This study aims to examine the relationship between the tenure of independent directors and the quality of financial reporting. The length of independent directors’ tenure has been a widely discussed and scrutinized issue in both academia and regulatory circles. A longer tenure is generally considered beneficial for the continuous accumulation of professional knowledge and industry experience, thereby enhancing supervisory capability. However, excessively long tenures may lead to overly close interactions with management, potentially impairing independence and weakening the effectiveness of oversight. This paper employs the Jones model to estimate the magnitude of discretionary accruals and conducts regression analyses using a sample of non-financial listed companies from 2013 to 2024. The empirical results indicate that longer tenures of independent directors help to restrain managerial earnings management behaviors, suggesting higher financial reporting quality. Furthermore, the study finds that when the proportion of internal directors on the board is higher, the effect of longer independent director tenure in curbing earnings management becomes more pronounced, further highlighting the important role played by independent directors on the board.

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