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研究生: 阮氏玉珊
Nguyen, Thi Ngoc Sang
論文名稱: 經濟政策不確定性與聯盟治理模式選擇:知識洩漏風險與關係機會主義的調節作用
Economic Policy Uncertainty and Alliance Governance Mode Choice: The Moderating Roles of Knowledge Leakage Risk and Relational Opportunism
指導教授: 張紹基
Chang, Shao-Chi
學位類別: 碩士
Master
系所名稱: 管理學院 - 國際企業研究所
Institute of International Business
論文出版年: 2026
畢業學年度: 114
語文別: 英文
論文頁數: 64
中文關鍵詞: 經濟政策不確定性聯盟治理股權聯盟交易成本理論知識基礎觀關係風險知識洩漏風
外文關鍵詞: economic policy uncertainty, alliance governance, equity alliance, transaction cost economics, knowledge-based view, relational risk, knowledge leakage risk
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  • 本研究探討地主國經濟政策不確定性(EPU)如何影響美國上市企業在股權與非股權聯盟治理模式之間的選擇,並識別調節此關係的二元層級條件。本研究以交易成本理論與知識基礎觀為理論基礎,透過二元邏輯迴歸與Chow檢定子樣本分析,針對2009至2016年間美國企業於29個地主國所形成的779個國際聯盟觀察值進行實證檢驗。
    研究結果支持假說一:地主國EPU越高,企業越傾向選擇非股權聯盟治理,與彈性邏輯一致,即政策波動提高了股權承諾的不可逆成本。假說二獲得支持並呈現符號逆轉:在契約密集度高的產業中,關係風險逆轉了EPU對股權偏好的負向效果,顯示EPU對法律執行機制的侵蝕使股權治理的私人秩序控制更具獨特價值。假說三未獲預期方向的支持:知識洩漏風險放大而非削弱EPU的負向效果,揭示了知識基礎觀在制度不確定性下的邊界條件。
    本研究結果記錄了制度不確定性下聯盟治理的彈性—控制悖論。

    This study examines how host-country economic policy uncertainty (EPU) shapes US public firms' choices between equity and non-equity alliance governance and identifies the dyad-level conditions that moderate this relationship. Drawing on Transaction Cost Economics and the Knowledge-Based View, three hypotheses are developed and tested using 779 international alliance observations across 29 host countries over 2009–2016.
    Results from binary logistic regression and Chow test subsample analyses support H1: higher EPU reduces equity alliance preference, consistent with a flexibility logic in which policy volatility raises the cost of irreversible equity commitments. H2 is supported with a sign reversal: relational risk reverses EPU's negative governance effect in contract-intensive industries, where EPU's erosion of legal enforcement makes equity's private-ordering controls uniquely valuable. H3 is not supported in the predicted direction: knowledge leakage risk amplifies rather than attenuates EPU's negative effect, identifying a boundary condition of KBV appropriability theory.
    These findings document a flexibility–control paradox in alliance governance under institutional uncertainty.

    ABSTRACT I 中文摘要 II ACKNOWLEDGEMENT III TABLE OF CONTENTS IV CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION 1 CHAPTER 2: LITERATURE REVIEW AND HYPOTHESIS DEVELOPMENT 5 2.1 Economic Policy Uncertainty and Corporate Governance Decisions 5 2.2 Alliance Governance Mode: The Equity vs. Non-Equity Choice 6 2.3 H1: EPU and the Preference for Non-Equity Governance 7 2.4 H2: Relational Risk as a Moderator of EPU's Governance Effect 8 2.4.1 The Conditional Role of Relational Risk 8 2.4.2 Distinguishing EPU from Institutional Quality in the Governance Mechanism 9 2.4.3 The Moderation Mechanism: How EPU and Relational Risk Jointly Determine Governance Choice 11 2.5 H3: Knowledge Leakage Risk as a Moderator of EPU's Governance Effect 12 2.5.1 The Conditional Role of Knowledge Leakage Risk 12 2.5.2 How Alliance Scope Breadth Determines Knowledge Leakage Risk 13 2.6 Integrated Framework 14 CHAPTER 3: DATA AND METHODOLOGY 16 3.1 Introduction 16 3.2 Research Sample 16 3.2.1 Sample Period: 2009–2016 16 3.2.2 Country Coverage: US Focal Firms and 29 Host Countries 17 3.2.3 Unit of Analysis 17 3.2.4 Industry Scope 18 3.2.5 Sample Construction and Observation Counts 18 3.3.1 Alliance Data: SDC Platinum 20 3.3.2 Relational Risk: Nunn (2007) Contract Intensity 20 3.3.3 Knowledge Leakage Risk: Alliance Scope Breadth 21 3.3.4 Additional Data Sources 23 3.4 Variables 25 3.4.1 Dependent Variable: Alliance Governance Mode 25 3.4.2 Independent Variable: Host Country EPU 25 3.4.3 Moderating Variable 1: Relational Risk 26 3.4.4 Moderating Variable 2: Knowledge Leakage Risk 26 3.4.5 Control Variables 26 3.5 Empirical Method 29 3.5.1 Primary Estimation: Binary Logistic Regression 29 3.5.2 Moderation Analysis: Subsample Analysis and Chow Test 30 3.5.3 Chapter Summary 31 CHAPTER 4: RESULTS 32 4.1 Descriptive Statistics and Correlation Matrix 32 4.2 Hypothesis 1: Main Effect of EPU on Alliance Governance Mode 36 4.3 Hypothesis 2: Relational Risk as a Moderator 39 4.4 Hypothesis 3: Knowledge Leakage Risk as a Moderator 42 4.5 Summary of Hypothesis Tests 45 4.6 Additional Analysis: Robustness Checks for H1 45 4.6.1 Alternative Estimation Method: Probit 46 4.6.2 Standardized EPU: Economic Significance 46 CHAPTER 5: DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION 49 5.1 Overview of Findings 49 5.2 Theoretical Contributions 49 5.3 Managerial Implications 50 5.4 Limitations and Future Research 51 5.5 Conclusion 51 REFERENCE 53

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