上市櫃公司因股東股權過於分散，往往無法對於公司起有效的監督效果，代理問題因此普遍性存在，如有私募股權基金者加入上市櫃公司，理論上將可以最大化公司價值，因私募股權基金擁有專業的知識優勢，持股也比一般散戶較高，但是私募股權基金加入之後其與被併購公司經理人(內文簡稱企業經理人)之間就產生了新的代理關係，若企業經理人與私募股權基金的目標不一致則產生新的代理問題，若企業經理人聯合私募股權基金追求他們的最大利益，而其兩者與一般股東之間也因此產生新的代理問題，所以私募股權基金進入企業之後的代理問題，是值得探討的課題。
本研究目的係希望藉由訪談國內已經引進私募股權基金之上市櫃公司之關係人，了解其對私募股權基金進入企業後所產生之新代理問題的看法，並藉此與專家學者之研究結果互相驗證。並將私募股權基金的代理問題更顯化，讓未來預備引進私募股權基金的企業可以有參考的準則，讓一般的小股東了解代理問題，知道如何保障自己的權益，讓已經引進私募股權基金者之企業做為借鏡以及將來互動之參考依據。
本研究是採用質性研究中之深度(In-depth interview)訪談法，透過訪談的方式可以做最直接的接觸，了解受訪者的想法，並能從訪談中獲取較豐富多元和真實的意見及資訊。本研究的訪談對象包含私募股權基金之仲介者(投資銀行&證券公司)、原公司之經理人、以及被私募股權基金併購後之委託經營之企業經理人、代表私募股權基金之專業經理人，希望藉由他們以不同角度研究私募股權基金進入企業後產生的代理問題。
本研究結論在於由於私募股權基金的特性與一般不同，私募股權基金進入公司後是明顯有其特殊的代理問題，結論如下:

壹、資訊不對稱問題:由於私募股權基金通常設定短期獲利出場且必需為尋找下一個投資對象保持好名聲，結論亦證明私募股權基金進入公司後對於資訊公開此事，是非常在意而且是有影響度的，且更有策略的揭露訊息。

貳、道德風險問題:
(一）、由於私募股權基金通常投資很多不同的公司，被投資公司之技術或其他核心能力被共用的問題，受訪者認為私募股權基金之目的係提高企業之獲利能力且通常不會同時投資同一產業，獲利出場也不會再投資同一產業，所以答案是否定的，但由於市場仍有投資同一產業之案例，以及本研究認為共用技術或核心能力不是容易顯現且易於衡量的，所以本研究尋找許多文獻並取得支持，結論是被投資公司之技術或其他核心能力被共用的問題是有可能存在的。
(二）、有關特權消費問題結論如下:
（1）.私募股權基金之高薪資制度更顯現。
(2）.私募股權基金為達短期績效，因此其決策將會影響長
期績效並在四個面向顯現A.人事方面、B.資產處置、
C.高槓桿經營、D.業務方面
参、逆向選擇權
若與私募股權基金合作進行中發現不如當初預期之逆向選擇權問題，結論是公司較無法提出反制能力，反而私募基金保留許多的保護條款，因為私募股權基金對於本身能力的了解多於企業經理人，在資訊不對稱情形之下，企業有可能選擇錯誤，選擇了一個無法勝任此能力的私募股權基金，那麼就會產生逆向選擇的問題。本研究希望提出此問題，提醒企業在選擇私募股權基金時應該要對此問題非常的慎重考慮。

In most listed companies shareholders don’t have the power to efficiently monitor the company because their rights are scattered. If private equity fund enter the listed company, the company’s value can theoretically be maximized because private equity has the advantage of professional knowledge, and is used to purchase more shares than general odd dealers. However, when the private equity enters, a new agent relationship between private equity and the managers of the acquired company (called business managers for short in the text) emerges. If the goals of the business managers and private equity differ, then a new agency issue occurs as well. If business managers unite with private equity and achieve the maximum profit, then another new agency issue emerges between these two parties and general shareholders. Therefore, the agency issues that arise after the private equity enters a company are worth discussing.
The goal of this study is to interview people who work in domestic listed companies that have already invited private equity funds and learn about their views of the new agency issues that arise after private equity funds enters the company, and to verify those findings with specialists and scholars. This is illuminate agency issues related to private equity and provides a reference for enterprises that wish to invite private equity in the future. Letting general shareholders know about the agency issue and how to protect their rights, as well as providing a paradigm or reference index for enterprises that have already invited private equity.
The research adopted the qualitative in-depth interview methodology to collect numerous real comments and information from direct interviews in order to understand interviewees’ points of view. We interviewed people who work in domestic listed companies that have already invited private equity funds. Interviewees include managers, brokers of private equity funds (investment banks & securities), and the managers who were entrusted when the enterprise merged with private equity. The agency issue was researched with respect to their different points of view.
The conclusion of this study lies in the differences between private equity funds and other funds, especially the nature of the specific agency issue that occurs
after private equity funds enter industries. The cases are summarized as follows:
Information asymmetry: Private equity funds are set to gain shortly and need to search for new investors to maintain their reputations. The conclusion is also proved that to disclose the information is careful and effective. There should be strategic disclosure after a private equity fund enters an industry.
Moral risk:
a. Since the private equity funds invest in various companies, there is an issue of sharing techniques and other core competencies. Interviewees denied that there was an issue since a private equity fund doesn’t invest the same companies again for the purpose of enhancing a company’s profitability. But some cases show this to be true. So the research shows that this issue is not easy to illuminate and evaluate. This study concludes that this issue exists and is supported by many documents.
b. Privileged spending is summarized as follows:
1. The high salaries of private equity funds are obvious.
2. In pursuit of short-term profits, the decisions of private equity funds will affect long-term profits. This can be seen in disposal of assets, highly leveraged businesses, and business practices.
Reverse option:
The reverse option may occur during the process of cooperating with a private equity fund and it proves that it is hard for companies counter the condition and the private equity fund retain some protective terms instead. Since private equity funds know more than other industry managers, the managers may select a private equity fund that it can’t afford due to information asymmetry. So, the reverse option occurs. This study hopes to reveal this problem and remind industries to choose private equity funds carefully.
Key words : private equity fund、agency issue、qualitative research

中文部分
期刊及論文:
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張翔一，2007，萬泰銀行增資風波—私募基金是福還是禍，天下雜誌，第380期，頁52。
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黃銘傑，2001，「公開發行公司法治與公司監控，法律與經濟之交錯」元照出版公司，商智文化事業股份有限公司，2002 年11 月。
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葉銀華、李存修、柯承恩，2002，公司治理與評等系統，商智文化事業股份有限公司。
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