本研究主要探討壟斷者擁有不同等級之兩種產品，在先發行高等級產品再發行一般等級產品的情況下，以定價及發售時間間隔為控制變數，使壟斷者的獲利最大為目標。研究中對壟斷者的優勢、產品特性及消費者種類進行定義；由於壟斷者於所在市場中並無競爭者，而消費者僅有一種選擇，因此壟斷者能以定價及發售時間間隔作為控制變數，而不須顧慮消費者選擇其它競爭者之產品。消費者分成高階消費者及一般消費者兩群，高階消費者對於產品有先取得的意願，對於價格因素較不敏感，主要著重於先發行之高等級產品的消費；一般消費者則對價格因素較為敏感，取得產品的方式以購買一般等級產品、高等級產品之二手產品或是其他取得方式為主，但對產品之興趣有隨時間衰退的情形。當壟斷者決定先發行高等級產品時，高階消費者將根據其特性而先行購買，經過某時間間隔後再發行一般等級產品吸引一般消費者，但產品間隔時間將會影響一般消費者的獲取產品方式及興趣，主要原因是隨高等級產品的發行時間持續時，將會有二手產品或是由其他管道獲得產品之情況發生，降低一般消費者對一般等級產品的需求；時間也會影響高階消費者的購買意願，根據高階消費者的特性而言，過早發行一般等級產品則因間隔時間過短，將會影響高等級產品的販售，以上現象將影響壟斷者的總利益，本研究將以價格與間隔時間作為控制變數，使壟斷者的總利益最大為目標。

In this research, we discuss the situation that a monopolist offers two versions of a product and the monopolist will sell the deluxe version then the regular one. The profit maximization model will be controlled by two factors, the price and the selling time. We will talk about the definitions of the monopolist’s advantages, product characteristics, and customer classification. Because the monopolist has no enemy in the market, customers have only one choice and the monopolist can use some strategies to effect their desire to purchase. In the market, the customers will buy the products once and the products selling in different time will effect each other by the saturation effect. There are two kinds of customers. Customers buying the deluxe version want to have the product earlier and care less about the price , called high-end customers. Customers buying the regular version pay more attention to the price of the product, and they can gain products by second hand ones or other channels, called low-end customers. And their interest of buying a new product will decrease by time. The monopolist will sell the deluxe version to skim the profits of high end customer, and then it will sell the regular one when the deluxe version is sold out. The selling time between two versions will decrease the interest of low end customers, and it will also effect the desire of high-end customers. When the selling time is too close, the demand of the deluxe version will drop off but the demand of the regular one will increase. With the standpoint of the monopolist, we choose two factors, price and selling time, to descript the situation above and to find the profit maximum.

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