最近，我們常常聽到有關許多公司支付高額獎酬給所謂的明星執行長。我們想要了解為何公司願意支付如此鉅額的薪資給予那些有名望的執行長?我們假設執行長的聲譽可以降低公司的負債資金成本，是因為聲譽可以減緩資訊不對稱及提升公司的利潤進而提高公司的支付能力。
我們透過三種方式去檢測執行長的聲譽和公司負債資金成本之間的關係，包括了press citation、DEA scores及IndAdjROA。樣本資料一共包含了1,156個從1992年至2009年在美發行的公司債。在我們的研究結果中，我們的資料顯示了公司執行長聲譽和負債資金成本是呈現顯著的負相關。
此外，我們也檢測了在高度不確定和產業競爭度高的二種情況下，公司執行長聲譽對負債資金成本的影響程度。我們發現在上述的情形下，執行長聲譽可以降低較多的負債資金成本。

Recently, we hear about many companies pay high compensation to star CEOs. We wonder about why companies will pay so large amount of money to those renowned CEOs? We hypothesis CEO’s reputation can lower firm’s cost of debt due to it mitigates the information asymmetry and raise the firm’s profit to pay back.
We through three measures to exam the relationship between the CEO’s reputation and cost of debt, including press citation, DEA scores, and IndAdjROA. The data consist of 1,156 bond issue in the U.S. over 1992-2009. In our study, we show the relationship between CEO’s reputation and cost of debt is negative and significant.
In addition, we also exam the effect of CEO’s reputation under high uncertainty condition and under competitive market on cost of debt, and we found CEO’s reputation can reduce more cost of debt under the above mentioned situations.

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