| 研究生: |
鄭植元 Cheng, Chih-yuan |
|---|---|
| 論文名稱: |
董事忠實義務之研究-以企業併購為中心 A Study of Corporate Directors』 Fiduciary Duties:From the Perspectives of Mergers and Acquisitions |
| 指導教授: |
陳俊仁
Chen, Jun-ren |
| 學位類別: |
碩士 Master |
| 系所名稱: |
社會科學院 - 法律學系 Department of Law |
| 論文出版年: | 2008 |
| 畢業學年度: | 96 |
| 語文別: | 中文 |
| 論文頁數: | 242 |
| 中文關鍵詞: | 注意義務 、忠誠義務 、忠實義務 、敵意收購 、公司機會理論 、商業判斷原則 、企業併購 、防禦措施 、董事 、交易保護條款 |
| 外文關鍵詞: | Fiduciary Duty, Business Judgment Rule, Defensive Advice, Duty Of Loyalty, Director, Duty Of Care, Hostile Takeover, Deal Protection Clause, Business Mergers And Acquisitions, Corporate Opportunity Theory |
| 相關次數: | 點閱:202 下載:12 |
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董事作為公司之業務執行機關,執行公司事務時對公司負有忠實義務,以避免因董事之行為損害到公司利益。而併購行為亦屬公司事務之一,董事在處理此類事務自亦有忠實義務之適用,因此需要瞭解董事之一般忠實義務內涵,以釐清董事基本的行為義務。只是併購行為影響公司甚大,僅依賴一般忠實義務規範恐有不足,故有必要依併購行為之特殊性而更進一步規範此類行為之忠實義務,以期更妥適地適用於董事處理公司併購之事務上。
在董事一般忠實義務上,就處理事務之注意義務層面,應肯定董事有積極地作為義務,以避免董事消極地忽略公司事務之執行,由此推演,應可肯定董事負有董事會之出席義務,以期可達到會議體制所具有匯聚眾人智慧進行討論之功能。並且,亦可肯定董事負有建立資訊監督系統之義務,以避免公司內部資訊傳達之不實,影響董事之決策。而為鼓勵董事積極任事,應尊重董事對公司事務之熟悉所為的決定,故將董事注意義務之過失責任標準降至重大過失責任,以避免其因決策動輒則咎。
在忠誠義務層面,應檢討董事涉有利益衝突之處理方式與少數股東之保護。因此,毋庸強制利益衝突董事迴避,亦不應藉由股東會之同意而使一利益衝突交易免除司法審查,因為此仍侵害少數股東之利益。故較為妥適的方法,應係藉由舉證責任之分配與司法審查之密度,來處理利益衝突董事是否進行迴避之問題;並且,股東會之同意不免除法院之司法審查,僅影響審查密度而已。再者,應增訂董事掠奪公司機會之規範,於董事獲悉一商業機會時,應將該機會提出於公司後,經公司拒絕發展該機會時,該董事方可利用此商業機會,以充分保障公司利益。最後,為求董事克盡其行為義務,可考慮將董事之一般忠實義務規範為法定責任,不以公司受有損害為要件,再輔以賠償責任範圍之限制,以期平衡董事行為義務之遵守與避免擔負風險過大,如此,應較可保護公司利益不受董事行為之侵害。
在董事併購行為之忠實義務下,就合意併購行為層面,應依據實務上併購協商之進行,階段性地規範董事行為義務:在初期併購協商時,應注意到當併購協商達到一定的合意,將對投資人產生影響其投資決策,此時,該資訊即具有重大性而有必要加以揭露,以避免投資人受到不測之損害。在意向書之簽訂階段,若無不受拘束之明文或其他表示外,其效力係日後訂立併購契約時,須以該意向書所同意之內容訂立之,雙方不得再行異議。在交易保護條款之訂立階段,應注意的是該條款之目的,在於避免董事任意中止併購程序的進行;並且,併購案之同意係屬股東會之權限。因此,董事自不具有簽訂以股東會同意該併購案為內容之交易保護條款的權限,故交易保護條款之效力亦應僅要求董事完成併購協商程序而已。
就敵意併購層面,基於董事擁有公司內部資訊之優勢,在面對敵意收購時,目標公司董事應負有積極之態度來評估該收購是否有利於公司,進而決定是否採取防禦措施。若董事採取防禦措施時,因該措施需耗費公司資源,且不可避免地保障了董事之職位,故有必要採取較為嚴格的審查基準,較為妥適的可先觀察董事採取防禦措施之動機是否係為了公司利益。若肯定時,進而判斷董事採行之防禦措施係因該收購對公司可能產生威脅,以及該防禦措施係針對該威脅所為而不過當。如此所為之防禦措施方具有正當性。
Directors, the internal organ in charge of corporate management, owe fiduciary duty to the corporation to avoid their conducts giving rise to damage to the corporation while operating. Since M&As are one form of operations, in which, the fiduciary duty is applicable thereof. However, M&As involve fundamental changes to the corporation, and it’s not enough to protect the corporation if solely depending on
fiduciary duties. It’s necessary to conduct a comprehensive research of general fiduciary duty law and to create enhanced standards corresponding to the unique of the M&As.
As to general fiduciary duty law, directors do owe active duty of care in corporate business, to avoid them from acting passively. Similarly, to accomplish the functions and goals of the collegiate system in board of directors, it’s an obligation to attend board’s meetings. Moreover, directors also have one duty to establish mechanisms to monitor information flow which eliminate false or untrue information transmits among internal organs, even influences board’s decisions. Nevertheless, for management flexibility, board’s decisions shall be respected and the due diligence standard shall be downgraded to gross negligence one.
As to the duty of loyalty, it’s appropriate to re-examine the present mechanisms which deal with conflicts of interest and protections to the minority shareholders. On the one hand, it would go too far to ask conflicts-of-interest directors to excuse themselves from board’s meetings compulsively, or to immunize one conflicts-of-interest transaction which obtained shareholders approvals or ratifications from judicial review. It’s would be more proper to look upon participations of conflicts-of-interest directors from the viewpoint of allocating burden of proof and
applying different standard of the judicial scrutiny. On the other hand, it’s time to develop the regulation of the corporate opportunity usurpation. When a project comes to the directors, they only can enjoy it after disclosing to the corporation and obtaining refusal to such project from the corporation. Finally, while striking a balance between directors’ accountability and risks they shoulder, it shall be necessary to remove the element, cause loss to the corporation, in determining whether directors’ conduct breaches duty of loyalty. In the same tine, directors shall be granted with the limitation to liability incurred from their breaches.
Fiduciary duty principles under M&As are varied. In negotiated and friendly M&As, the legislators shall accord to business reality to determine separated directors’ obligations in varied stages. In the beginning of the M&As negotiation, directors shall concern about information disclosure as long as the consensus of transaction parties is nearly mature and to have influence on investors’ decisions. In other words, it’s a material fact. While signing a letter of intent, unless statements suggest otherwise, the latter negotiated M&As contracts shall have equivalent content to the letter of intent without further amendments. As to the function of the deal protection provisions, it’s designed to prohibit directors from ceasing transaction at will. Moreover, any M&A proposal is under shareholders’ authority, and it lies beyond the discretion of directors to accept any deal protection provision which demands board of directors to obtain shareholders’ approvals or ratifications. Hence, such provision solely is applied to ensure directors to complete whole M&As procedures.
As to hostile takeovers, from the perspective of information asymmetry, directors are expected to actively analyze and determine whether such transaction would benefit the corporation, or take defensive advices. When directors decide to fight, it unavoidably and obviously involves the use of corporate assets and conflicts of interest, entrenchment of the incumbents. Directors’ decisions shall be examined under enhanced scrutiny. The courts first observe whether directors motivated for corporate interests, and then, if yes, examine whether such a device is a reasonable and proportional response to the threat incurred from hostile takeovers. If the answer is still yes, it’s a sustainable action and directors breach their fiduciary duty.
壹、中文書目
1. 王文宇,公司法論,元照,2005年8月,二版一刷。
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3. 邱聰智,債法各論(中冊),自版,輔仁大學法學叢書,1996年10月,初版 二刷。
4. 陳彥良,公司治理法制-公司內部機關組織職權論,翰蘆圖書,2007年1月,初版。
5. 曾宛如,公司管理與資本市場法制專論(一),學林,2002年10月,初版。
6. 黃銘傑,企業併購法之檢討與省思,公司治理與企業金融法制之挑戰與興革,元照,2006年9月 ,初版一刷。
7. ______,我國公司法制關於敵意併購與防衛措施規範之現狀與未來,公司治理與企業金融法制之 挑戰與興革,元照,2006年9月,初版一刷。
8. 廖大穎,公司法原論,三民,2006年6月,修訂三版一刷。
9. ______,公司制度與企業金融之法理,元照,2003年3月,初版一刷。
10. 黃立主編,民法債篇各論(上),元照,2004年10月,初版三刷。
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13. ______,新證券交易法實例研習,元照,2007年2月,五版1刷。
貳、中文期刊
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12. 何曜琛,公司治理與公開發行公司董事之告知義務,華岡法粹,30期,2003年12月。
13. 吳佳慧,變革後公開收購制度之簡介,證交資料,491期,2003年3月。
14. 谷湘儀發言,「企業併購法之新趨勢」學術座談會,台灣本土法學,60期,2004年7月。
15. 林仁光,公司治理之理論與實踐-經營者支配或股東支配之衝突與調整,台大學法論叢,33卷3 期,2004年5月。
16. 林仁光發言,「企業併購法之新趨勢」學術座談會,台灣本土法學,60期,2004年7月。
17. 林宜男,董監事、經理人職責之公司治理機制-以金融控股公司為例,政大法學評論,75期, 2003年9月。
18. 林國彬,敵意併購防禦措施之研究--黃金降落傘(Golden Parachute),萬國法律,152期,2007 年4月。
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20. ______,論企業道德行為準則-移植模式的分析與檢討,律師雜誌,310期,2005年7月。
21. 姚思遠,OECD公司治理原則(2004),華岡法粹,32期,2004年12月。
22. 洪秀芬,董事會獨立經營權限及董事注意義務,政大法學評論,94期,2006年12月。
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24. 張振山、包幸玉,我國資訊公開制度之探討,證券暨期貨月刊,22卷4期,2004年4月。
25. 許朱賢,併購訊息之揭露義務與證券詐欺責任,軍法專刊,51卷4期,2005年4月。
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27. 陳介山,企業併購法第6條獨立專家之研究,財產法暨經濟法,2期,2005年6月。
28. 陳幼宜,論公司併購之方式--以公開收購法律規範之檢討為中心,萬國法律,152期,2007年4月 。
29. 陳俊仁,由企業併購法第五條與第六條論我國忠實義務規範的缺失,華岡法粹,33期,2005年6 月。
30. ______,忠誠義務論公司負責人之競業禁止規範,月旦民商法雜誌,15期,2007年3月。
31. ______,董事之積極作為義務-論我國公司法第193條之缺失,成大法學,13期,2007年6月。
32. ______,論公司本質與公司社會責任-董事忠實義務之規範與調和-,台灣本土法學,94期,2007 年5月。
33. ______,論公司治理的發展趨勢-企業弊案後之反思,律師雜誌,310期,2005年7月。
34. ______,論股東於公司之地位-股東於公開發行公司角色與功能之檢視,成大法學,12期,2006 年12月。
35. 陳彥良,反併購措施法制之研析(上)-德國法啟示兼論金鼎案之實證-,台灣本土法學,86期, 2006年9月。
36. ______,反併購措施法制之研析(下)-德國法啟示兼論金鼎案之實證-,台灣本土法學,87期, 2006年10月。
37. 陳春山、張馥羽,我國公司併購過程中法律爭議,實用月刊,326期,2002年2月。
38. 陳錦隆,美國法上董事「經營判斷法則」之概說(一),會計研究,194期,2002年1月。
39. ______,美國法上董事「經營判斷法則」之概說(三),會計研究,196期,2002年3月。
40. ______,新修正公司法董事之忠實義務解析(一),會計研究,200期,2002年7月。
41. 陳麗娟,美國企業併購法防禦收購措施之研究:以德拉瓦公司法為例,東海大學法學研究,25期 ,2006年12月。
42. 曾宛如,董事忠實義務之內涵及適用疑義-評析新修正公司法第二十三條第一項,台灣本土法學 ,38期,2002年9月。
43. 曾宛如發言,董事忠實義務之內涵及適用疑義-評析新修正公司法第23條1項,民法研究會第30 次學術研討會會議紀錄,法學叢刊,190期,2003年4月。
44. 黃銘傑,公司治理與董監民事責任之現狀及課題-以外部董事制度及忠實、注意義務為中心,律 師雜誌,305期,2005年2月。
45. 黃慧嫺,公開收購活動涉及之法律問題淺析-以美國及歐盟對於敵意收購之制約為例,科技法律 透析,15卷1期,2003年1月。
46. ______,事業組織調整法制淺析-以德國公開收購法為例(下),科技法律透析,14卷9期, 2002年9月。
47. ______,從德國有價證券公開收購法制看我國公開收購公開發行有價證券管理辦法之修正,今日 會計,89期,2002年12月。
48. ______,歐盟第十三號公司法指令草案(收購要約指令草案)簡介,科技法律透析,14卷12期, 2002年12月。
49. 楊竹生,論董事注意義務中監督公司業務執行之義務,中原財經法學,13期,2004年12月。
50. 楊君仁,敵意併購的法律問題,社會文化學報,13期,2001年12月。
51. 廖大穎,論股份轉換法製程序與股東權之保護,政大法學評論,83期,2005年2月。
52. 劉紹樑,我國併購法制的蛻變與前瞻,經社法制論叢,32期,2003年7月。
53. 劉連煜,公開收購股權與惡意購併,月旦法學,75期,2001年8月。
54. 劉連煜發言,「企業併購法之新趨勢」學術座談會,台灣本土法學,60期,2004年7月。
55. 蔡宏瑜,修正公司法第23條1項有關公司負責人忠實義務之探討(對公司之責任)-淺論日本商 法規定對於公司負責人忠實義務所界定之意義及範圍,玄奘法律學報,3期,2005年6月。
56. 賴英照,公開收購的法律規範,金融風險管理季刊,1卷2期,2005年6月。
參、中文碩士論文
1. 石青平,論公司之管控,私立東海大學法律學碩士班碩士論文,2002年7月。
2. 李宜容,從公司治理論董事及經理人報酬之規範,國立台北大學法學系碩士論文,2007年7月。
肆、英文書目
1. BRUNER, ROBERT F. APPLIED MERGERS AND ACQUISITIONS (2004).
2. CLARK, ROBERT CHARLES CORPORATIONS LAW (1986).
3. EASTERBROOK, FRANK H. AND FISCHEL, DANIEL R. THE ECONOMIC STRUCTURE OF CORPORATE LAW (1998).
4. GEVURTZ, FRANKLIN A. CORPORATION LAW (2000).
5. HAMILTON, ROBERT W. CORPORATION (4th ed. 1997).
6. ______. THE LAW OF CORPORATIONS IN A NUTSHELL (5th ed. 2000).
7. HAZEN, THOMAS LEE AND MARKHAM, JERRY W. MERGERS, ACQUISITIONS AND OTHER BUSINESS COMBINATIONS CASES AND MATERIALS (2003).
8. HAZEN, TOMAS LEE PRINCIPLES OF SECURITIES REGULATION (2005).
9. OESTERLE, DALE A. MERGER AND ACQUISITIONS IN A NUTSHELL (2th ed. 2006).
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陸、網路資訊
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