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研究生： 林晏安
Lin, Yan-An
論文名稱： 應用合作賽局理論獲得合理利益分配之無關鍵中心化供應鏈經營模式
A Decentralized Supply-Chain Management Model Using Cooperative Game Theory for a Reasonable Profit Allocation
指導教授： 張珏庭
Chang, Chuei-Tin
學位類別： 碩士
Master
系所名稱： 工學院 - 化學工程學系
Department of Chemical Engineering
論文出版年： 2020
畢業學年度： 108
語文別： 中文
論文頁數： 208
中文關鍵詞： 石油供應鏈 、合作賽局理論 、夏普利值 、奈許議價方程式
外文關鍵詞： Petroleum supply chain, cooperative game theory, Sharpley value, Nash bargaining equation, Core
相關次數： 點閱：142  下載：5 
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    • 傳統的石化產業由於全球經濟的整合而面臨重大挑戰，供應鏈如何經營管理使利益最佳化成為重要議題。傳統的供應鏈經營方法僅考慮總體經濟效益最大化而未考慮參與者間利益分配問題。而現今的供應鏈經營強調如何在整體獲得最大利益的前提下，考慮成員間進行公平地利益分配。過去許多文獻中，將夏普利值或奈許議價方程式應用於無關鍵中心化的供應鏈經營(decentralized supply-chain management)，而鮮少將兩者合併討論。而本研究發展一套流程，結合核(core)、夏普利值(Shapley value)與奈許議價方程式(Nash bargaining equation)三種方法。我們先以夏普利值獲得合理的利益分配，接著以核檢驗其結果是否具有聯盟穩定性，最後以奈許議價方程式之觀點進一步探討成員間相對的影響力關係。我們利用這套流程，以具體石油供應鏈為例，針對不同的供應鏈結構、合作前中間產品進出口價格差異與中間產品價格波動等因素分為多個案例與情境討論，最後皆得到合理的分配結果。

    The ultimate objective of supply chain management is to allocate benefits fairly among participating members under the condition that the overall profit is maximized. In order to achieve this goal, three existing methods, i.e., the core, the Shapley value and the Nash bargaining formula, have been integrated in this work for running a petroleum supply network, and assessing the impacts of various (1) supply-chain structures, (2) import prices of intermediate products, and (3) their import and export price differ-ences. It was found that varying the above factors does create significant impacts on the Shapley values. On the other hand, the negotiation-power indictors of members and the size of core region are not affected by price changes if the import and export price difference is maintained at the same level. Finally, extensive case studies have been carried out to demonstrate the practicability of the above benefit allocation strategy.

    摘要 I Extend Abstract II 誌謝 VIII 表目錄 XIV 圖目錄 XIX 符號表 XXV 第1章 緒論 1 1.1 研究動機 1 1.2 文獻回顧 2 1.3 研究目的 4 1.4 組織章節 5 第2章 供應鏈成員間公平的獲利分配 6 2.1 聯盟賽局 6 2.2 夏普利值法 10 2.2.1 邊際效益 10 2.2.2 夏普利值計算 11 2.2.3 例題 12 2.3 聯盟穩定性 15 2.3.1 核定義 15 2.3.2 核的基本原則 15 2.3.3 例題 17 2.4 奈許議價方程式 19 2.4.1 奈許議價問題解(Nash bargaining solution) 與五項原則 20 2.4.2 證明 23 2.4.3 奈許議價方程式(Nash bargaining equation) 27 2.4.4 協商因子的意涵 28 第3章 石油供應鏈 32 3.1 石油供應鏈範圍 32 3.2 石油供應鏈的原料、產品及客戶 33 3.2.1 原料 33 3.2.2 產品及客戶 33 3.3 生產單元與輸儲設施 34 3.3.1 常壓蒸餾單元(Atmospheric distillation unit) 35 3.3.2 真空蒸餾單元(Vacuum distillation unit) 35 3.3.3 石油焦單元(Coker) 36 3.3.4 流體化床觸媒裂解單元(Fluidized-bed catalytic cracking unit) 36 3.3.5 輕油裂解單元(Naphtha cracker) 37 3.3.6 丁二烯萃取單元(Butadiene extraction unit) 37 3.3.7 芳香烴萃取單元(Aromatics extraction unit) 38 3.3.8 加氫脫硫單元(Hydroytreater) 39 3.3.9 重組單元(Reforming unit) 39 3.3.10 二甲苯分離單元(Xylene fractonation unit) 40 3.3.11 二甲苯吸附單元(Parex unit) 41 3.3.12 二甲苯異構化單元(Xylene isomar unit) 41 3.3.13 轉烷化單元(Tatoray unit) 42 3.3.14 輸儲設施 42 3.4 供應鏈結構 43 3.5 虛擬賽局成員的劃分 44 3.5.1 案例一 45 3.5.2 案例二 46 3.5.3 案例三 48 第4章 數學規劃模式 50 4.1 基本單元模式 50 4.1.1 反應型製程 50 4.1.2 分離型製程 52 4.1.3 儲槽型製程 52 4.1.4 獲利與成本計算 53 4.2 結構限制式 56 4.2.1 油料儲存與操作限制 56 4.2.2 油料進、出口限制 57 4.2.3 油料市場需求上限 58 4.3 目標函數 59 第5章 案例探討 60 5.1 案例一 61 5.1.1 情境一 63 5.1.2 情境二 66 5.1.3 情境三 74 5.1.4 綜合比較 81 5.2 案例二 82 5.2.1 情境一 84 5.2.2 情境二 88 5.2.3 情境三 96 5.2.4 情境四 104 5.2.5 情境五 112 5.2.6 情境六 119 5.2.7 綜合比較 126 5.3 案例三 128 5.3.1 情境一 130 5.3.2 情境二 136 5.3.3 情境三 150 5.3.4 情境四 161 5.3.5 情境五 171 5.3.6 情境六 180 5.3.7 綜合比較 189 5.4 總結 190 第6章 結論與展望 194 6.1 結論 194 6.2 展望 195 參考資料 196 附錄一-參數表 198 附錄二-整體聯盟物料銷售表 208

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