隨著臺灣各縣市鐵路立體化工程持續推動，場站周邊土地之釋出與再開發逐漸成為都市空間重構與臺鐵公司化後財務永續經營的重要策略。然而，在實務推動過程中，聯合開發仍面臨多重挑戰，包括開發程序冗長、法規限制繁複、開發期程不確定，以及市場需求與成本變動所帶來之收益風險。此外，傳統以淨現值（Net Present Value, NPV）為主之財務評估方法，多屬靜態分析，難以充分反映長期開發案在不同市場情境下所具備之管理彈性與策略調整空間。再者，聯合開發涉及公部門、資產提供者與民間投資人等多方參與者，若缺乏明確之價格性承諾機制與合理之權益分配原則，容易導致合作過程中產生爭議，進而影響開發效率與合作穩定性。
本研究旨在建構整合實質選擇權（Real Options）與賽局理論（Game Theory）之分析架構，並以松山車站聯合開發案為例。研究方法上，以淨現值法建立基準，再導入Black-Scholes模型評估開發權利價值評估在市場不確定性與開發彈性條件下之開發權利價值；接續以第一價格密封標（First-Price Sealed Bid Auction）拍賣觀點說明投資人於估值、價格性承諾與利潤間之權衡，最後以合作賽局與夏普利值（Shapley Value）檢核分配合理性。
實證結果顯示，淨現值估值為25.61億元；納入不確定性後，實質選擇權價值提升至56.30至73.13億元，顯示傳統評估可能低估開發價值。價格性承諾方面折現為15.36億元，占NPV約59.98%；投資人仍保留約10.25億元（40.02%），反映競標策略與風險考量。
合作賽局分析部分顯示，公部門理論與實際分配分別為41.93與40.94億元，投資方為22.05與23.05億元，比例差距僅1.5%，顯示分配接近理論公平基準。
本研究整合傳統財務評估、實質選擇權與賽局分析方法，提出整合性之分析架構。研究結果指出，淨現值雖可作為基本可行性判斷工具，但不足以反映開發彈性與不確定性價值；實質選擇權可補強對開發權利價值之評估；而賽局分析則有助於理解價格形成機制與權益分配合理性。未來在推動鐵路場站聯合開發時，應將管理彈性、風險分擔與分配機制納入制度設計與契約規劃，以提升整體開發之財務可行性與公私合作之長期穩定性。

With the continued implementation of railway elevation and station-area redevelopment projects in Taiwan, railway station joint development has become an important strategy for urban regeneration and the financial sustainability of the Taiwan Railway Corporation. This study constructs an integrated framework combining Net Present Value (NPV), Real Options, Auction Game Theory, and Cooperative Game Theory, using the Songshan Station joint development project as the empirical case.
The empirical results show that the traditional NPV of the project is approximately NT$2.561 billion. After incorporating uncertainty and managerial flexibility through the Black-Scholes Real Options model, the estimated development right value increases to NT$5.630–7.313 billion, indicating that static financial evaluation may underestimate the long-term value of station joint development. In the auction game analysis, the discounted value of price commitments, including development rights payment, land rent, and operating rights payment, is NT$1.536 billion, accounting for 59.98% of the NPV estimate. Under the NPV baseline, the investor retains approximately NT$1.025 billion, or 40.02% of the estimated value.
The cooperative game analysis further shows that the public sector’s Shapley Value is NT$4.193 billion, compared with an actual allocation of NT$4.094 billion. The investor’s Shapley Value is NT$2.205 billion, compared with an actual allocation of NT$2.305 billion. The difference between theoretical and actual allocation is only about 1.5 percentage points, suggesting that the actual allocation is broadly consistent with the marginal-contribution-based benchmark.

Black, F., & Scholes, M. (1973). The pricing of options and corporate liabilities. Journal of Political Economy, 81(3), 637–654. Retrieved from https://doi.org/10.1086/260062
Cervero, R., Ferrell, C., & Murphy, S. (2002). Transit-oriented development and joint development in the United States: A literature review. Transit Cooperative Research Program, Research Results Digest 52.
De Clerck, D., & Demeulemeester, E. (2016). Creating a more competitive PPP procurement market: A game theoretical analysis. Journal of Management in Engineering, 32(6).
Fudenberg, D., & Maskin, E. (1986). The folk theorem in repeated games with discounting or with incomplete information. Econometrica, 54(3), 533–554.
Gu, Y., Lord, A., Eika, A., Dethier, P., Samsura, D. A. A., Nordahl, B. I., Sommervoll, D. E., van der Krabben, E., & Halleux, J.-M. (2021). Fair shares? Advancing land economics through cooperative game theory. Land Use Policy, 106, 105400.
Gao, G.-X. (2018). Sustainable winner determination for public-private partnership infrastructure projects in multi-attribute reverse auctions. Sustainability, 10(11), 4129.
Hart, S., & Mas-Colell, A. (1989). Potential, Value, and Consistency. Econometrica, 57(3), 589–614. https://doi.org/10.2307/1911054
Kim, T. (1989). Bidding in real estate: A game theoretic approach. Journal of Real Estate Finance and Economics, 2, 239–251.
Myers, S. C. (1977). Determinants of corporate borrowing. Journal of Financial Economics, 5(2), 147–175. Retrieved from https://doi.org/10.1016/0304-405X(77)90015-0 .
Nash, J. (1951). Non-cooperative games. Annals of Mathematics, 54(2), 286–295.
Kang, C. C., Lee, T. S., & Huang, S. C. (2013). Royalty bargaining in public–private partnership projects: Insights from a theoretic three-stage game auction model. Transportation Research Part E: Logistics and Transportation Review, 59, 1–14.
Quan, D. C. (1994). Real estate auctions: A survey of theory and practice. Journal of Real Estate Finance and Economics, 9, 23–49.
Titman, S. (1985). Urban Land Prices Under Uncertainty. The American Economic Review, 75(3), 505–514. http://www.jstor.org/stable/1814815
Trigeorgis, L. (1993). Real options and interactions with financial flexibility. Financial Management, 22(3), 202–224. Retrieved from https://doi.org/10.2307/3665939
Williamson, O.E. (1979). Transaction-Cost Economics: The Governance of Contractual Relations. The Journal of Law & Economics, 22(2), 233-261.
Williams, J. T. (1991). Real estate development as an option. Journal of Real Estate Finance And Economics, 4, 191–208.
Yen, B. T. H., Feng, C. M., & Lee, T.C. (2023). Transit-oriented development strategy in Taiwan: An application of land value capture. Asian Transport Studies, 9, 100094. Retrieved from https://doi.org/10.1016/j.eastsj.2022.100094
柯伯昇, 楊明昌. (2005). 高雄捷運BOT計畫廠站聯合開發之財務評估與風險分析－以南機廠開發計畫為例. 貨幣市場, 9(2).
梁仁旭, (2007). 不動產開發選擇權時間價值比之實證分析. 都市與計劃, 34(1), 1-12
梁正芳, 高文彥,& 邱靖棠. (2007). 捷運聯合開發位於都市更新地區運作實務之探討. 捷運技術半年刊, 36, 61-72.
康照宗, 馮正民,& 王世寧. (2013). 交通建設BOT計畫特許年期與權利金議題談判模式之研究. 運輸計畫季刊, 42(3), 247-274.
陳博亮, 劉芬美, 陳昭勳. (2016). 公私合夥專案計畫於規劃階段合約談判之最佳解. 中國土木水利工程學刊, 28(2), 117-127.
康照宗, 馮正民,& 陳佑昇. (2019). 交通建設計畫之價值回饋與財務自償及風險分析研究：以租稅增額融資為例. 運輸計畫季刊, 48(3), 219-251.
荷世平, 葉易. (2021). 營造業聯合承攬促進合作之賽局模型與策略設計. 中國土木水利工程學刊, 33(7), 555-563.
彭建文, 馮靖博,& 丁玟甄. (2011). 待更新不動產之實質選擇權價值分析. 住宅學報, 20(2), 1-26.
羅文貞,& 劉虹彤.(2019). 捷運土開大樓辦理招商有關權益轉換制度探討─以C1D1招商機制為例. 中華技術期刊, 122, 64-73.
蘇進雄, 陳澤義, 王詩韻,& 吳雪伶. (2019). 不動產估價的另類選擇：模糊實質選擇權模型. 住宅學報, 28(1), 51-81.
王郁芬, (2012). 以合作賽局看合作聯盟－以Garmin與Asus為例. (碩士), 逢甲大學經營管理碩士在職專班, 台中市. Retrieved from https://hdl.handle.net/11296/fw7435
田巧, (2022). 臺北市社會住宅投資價值之評估–實質選擇權方法應用. (碩士), 銘傳大學財務金融學系, 台北市. Retrieved from https://hdl.handle.net/11296/6tjjvh
呂峻豪, (2013). 夏普利值、個體合理性及其公設化. (碩士), 國立屏東教育大學應用數學系, 屏東縣. Retrieved from https://hdl.handle.net/11296/wyxs5h
許時翰, (2008). 以合作賽局理論探討都市更新權利變換方式利益分配之研究. (碩士), 國立台灣科技大學建築研究所, 台北市. Retrieved from https://hdl.handle.net/11296/4a7zpv
陳劭岳, (2016). 應用合作賽局理論於專案計畫效益分配模式之比較研究. (碩士),國立聯合大學土木與防災工程研究所, 苗栗縣. Retrieved from https://hdl.handle.net/11296/p2kdzd
陳禾澤. (2019). 台北捷運聯合開發權益分配鑑價機制之研究. (碩士), 國立中央大學, 桃園市. Retrieved from https://hdl.handle.net/11296/5d3289
蔣佳蓁.(2014).外商銀行的進入模式：以實質選擇權理論分析. (碩士), 東吳大學國際經營與貿易學系,台北市. Retrieved from https://hdl.handle.net/11296/4g4rw4
Calthorpe, P. (1993). The Next American Metropolis: Ecology, Community, and the American Dream. Princeton Architectural Press.
Dixit, A. K., & Pindyck, R. S. (1994). Investment under uncertainty. Princeton University Press.
Dudkin, G., & Välilä, T. (2005). Transaction costs in public-private partnerships: A first look at the evidence. Economic and Financial Report. No. 2005/03. European Investment Bank (EIB), Luxembourg.
De Clerck, D., & Demeulemeester, E. (2014). Towards a more competitive PPP procurement market: A game-theoretical analysis. KU Leuven, Faculty of Economics and Business.
Gibbons, R. (1992). A primer in game theory. Harvester Wheatsheaf.
Hazra, T., Anjaria, K., Bajpai, A., & Kumari, A. (2024). Applications of Game Theory in Deep Learning. Springer Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-54653-2 .
Krishna, V. (2010). Auction Theory(2). Pennsylvania State University Press.
Osborne, M. J., & Rubinstein, A. (1994). A course in game theory. MIT Press.
Stackelberg, H. F. V. (1934). Marktform und Gleichgewicht (Market and Equilibrium), Vienna.
Shapley, L. S. (1953). A value for n-person games. In H. W. Kuhn & A. W. Tucker (Eds.), Contributions to the Theory of Games II (pp. 307–317). Princeton University Press.
Williamson, O. E. (1989). Handbook of industrial organization., Transaction cost economics., (Vol. 1, Chapter 3, pp. 135–182). Elsevier Science Publishers B. V.
Wu, C., & Buyya, R. (2015). Cloud data centers and cost modeling. Morgan Kaufmann. https://doi.org/10.1016/C2014-0-02596-1
施鴻志. (1997). 都市規劃. 建都文化事業
羅婉寧.(2024). 捷運聯合開發案問題之研究-以美河市為例,新北市政府113年度自行研究報告.
Hale. (2013). Mass Transit Project Financing - new and alternative approaches. World Transit Research. 4923. https://www.worldtransitresearch.info/research/4923