本研究主要探討ESG資訊揭露是否受到董監事與高階主管持股比例影響。本研究從台灣經濟新報資料庫(簡稱TEJ資料庫)及公開資訊觀測站選取2021年上市櫃公司數據為樣本，以迴歸方法(ordinary least squares，簡稱OLS) 來檢驗當董監與高管持股比例越高時，是否會影響ESG資訊揭露透明度，另外探討ESG資訊揭露拆分為環境保護 ( Environment )、社會責任 ( Social )及公司治理 ( Governance )時，公司是否對於資訊揭露透明度有不同影響。
本文結果顯示，當董監事與經理人持股比例越高時，公司對於ESG資訊揭露持保守態度；其可能代表意涵管理階層認為人力及時間成本昂貴且法令尚未完善並未強制要求所有公司揭露，怕投資過多成本在ESG資訊會為企業帶來沉重負擔，不符合經濟效益。當十大股東持股比例越高時，公司更不願意揭露ESG資訊；其可能代表意涵台灣公司多以家族企業導向，大股東股權集中度高，外部投資人占比低，所以不關心ESG資訊揭露程度。

This study primarily examines whether ESG information disclosure is influenced by the shareholding ratio percentage of directors, supervisors, and top executives. The study is selected from the Taiwan Economic Journal (TEJ) database and the data of Taiwan’s listed companies in 2021. Ordinary least squares (OLS) regression analysis is employed to examine whether higher shareholding ratio percentages of directors, su-pervisors, and top ten executives affect the transparency of ESG information disclosure.
The results show that companies tend to adopt a conservative stance towards ESG in-formation disclosure when the shareholding ratio percentages of directors, supervisors, and top ten executives are higher. This suggests that management may perceive diffi-culties in obtaining ESG information, consider the human and time costs involved, and view the legal requirements for disclosure as not yet fully developed or mandatory for all companies. They may be concerned that excessive investments in ESG information would impose a heavy burden on the company without corresponding economic bene-fits. Moreover, companies are even less willing to disclose ESG information when the ownership percentages of the top ten shareholders are higher. This could imply that many Taiwanese companies are family-oriented, characterized by high concentration of ownership among major shareholders and a lower proportion of external investors, thereby showing less concern for ESG information disclosure.

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