簡易檢索 / 詳目顯示

研究生: 陳俏麗
Tanugraha, Milka Benita
論文名稱: The Effect of CEO Compensation and Risk-taking Incentives to Investment Opportunity Set: Does CEO Gender Matter?
The Effect of CEO Compensation and Risk-taking Incentives to Investment Opportunity Set: Does CEO Gender Matter?
指導教授: 謝惠璟
Hsieh, Hui-Ching Sana
學位類別: 碩士
Master
系所名稱: 管理學院 - 國際經營管理研究所
Institute of International Management
論文出版年: 2020
畢業學年度: 108
語文別: 英文
論文頁數: 72
外文關鍵詞: Investment Opportunity Set (IOS), CEO Equity-based Compensation, Risk-taking Incentives, CEO Pay-performance Sensitivity, CEO Gender
相關次數: 點閱:129下載:0
分享至:
查詢本校圖書館目錄 查詢臺灣博碩士論文知識加值系統 勘誤回報
  • A set of investment opportunity (IOS) reflects the firm prospective investment opportunity and payoff corresponding to investment in firm-specific physical and human capital. However, the value of future discretionary investment will rely on the managerial skill, particularly CEO who has the highest authority in corporate decision-making. Presently, the use of equity- based compensation package has been increasingly received a lot of attention in corporation and financial literature. This research aims to analyze the effect of CEO equity-based compensation to the firm’s investment opportunity set in U.S. We provide further analysis of how the sensitivity of CEO wealth with respect to firm’s stock price (Delta) and stock return volatility (Vega) will affect the investment opportunity set. Our finding suggest that firms compensated their CEO with equity-based compensation is effectively bring positive impact to firm’s IOS. We also find that as CEOs get more sensitive to their wealth with respect to firm stock price and stock return volatility, the IOS will also be higher, even more pronounced with Delta. This research takes deeper analysis of how the innate behavior such as gender influence the effect of compensation packages to IOS. Evidently, the result of this study suggests that in general gender doesn’t give direct impact to corporate decision-making. Female CEO act differently only under certain boundary condition. In the difference level of CEO tenure and total compensation pay, female CEO does matter and influence the effect of equity-based compensation, as well as Delta and Vega to the firm’s IOS.

    TABLE OF CONTENTS ABSTRACT ...................................................................................................................I ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS ..........................................................................................II TABLE OF CONTENTS ............................................................................................ III LIST OF TABLES .....................................................................................................VII LIST OF FIGURES.................................................................................................. VIII CHAPTER ONE INTRODUCTION ............................................................................ 1 1.1 Research Background...................................................................................... 1 1.1.1 The Importance of Investment Opportunity Set. ................................... 2 1.1.2 The Importance of CEO and Rising Trend of Equity-based Compensation........................................................................................ 4 1.1.3 Sensitivity of CEO Wealth. .................................................................... 7 1.1.4 Female CEO.......................................................................................... 8 1.2 Research Objective and Motivation. ............................................................... 9 1.3 Research Gaps and Contributions. ................................................................ 10 1.4 Research Structure......................................................................................... 11 CHAPTER TWO LITERATURE REVIEW............................................................... 12 2.1 Agency Theory............................................................................................... 12 2.2. Behavioral Agency Model (BAM). .............................................................. 13 2.3 Investment Opportunity Set (IOS)................................................................. 14 2.4 CEO Equity-based Compensation................................................................. 15 2.5 CEO Pay-performance Sensitivity (DELTA) and CEO Risk-taking Incentives (VEGA). ....................................................................................................... 16 2.6 CEO-Gender. ................................................................................................. 18 2.7 CEO-Tenure................................................................................................... 20 2.8 Hypotheses Development.............................................................................. 21 2.8.1 CEO Equity-based Compensation and Firm’s Investment Opportunity Set. ....................................................................................................... 21 2.8.2 CEO Pay-performance Sensitivity (DELTA) and Firm’s Investment Opportunity Set.................................................................................... 23 2.8.3 CEO Risk-taking Incentives (VEGA) and Firm’s Investment Opportunity Set.................................................................................... 24 2.8.4 The Role of Female CEO and CEO Compensation to Firm’s IOS. .... 25 2.8.5 The Mediating Role of CEO Tenure.................................................... 26 2.8.6 The Mediating Role of CEO Total Compensation. ............................. 28 CHAPTER THREE RESEARCH DESIGN AND METHODOLOGY...................... 30 3.1 Data Collection.............................................................................................. 30 3.2 Dependent Variable: Investment Opportunity Set (IOS)............................... 30 3.3 Independent Variable. .................................................................................... 33 3.3.1 Percentage of CEO Equity-based Compensation (PEBC).................. 33 3.3.2 CEO Equity-based Compensation (EQUITYPAY). ............................. 33 3.3.3 CEO Pay-Performance Sensitivity (Delta) and Risk-Taking Incentives (Vega)................................................................................................... 34 3.3.4 CEO Gender. ....................................................................................... 36 3.4 Mediating Variables....................................................................................... 36 3.4.1 CEO Total Compensation. .................................................................. 36 3.4.2 CEO Tenure......................................................................................... 36 3.5 Control Variables. .......................................................................................... 37 3.6 Methodology and Regression Model............................................................. 38 3.6.1 Model. ................................................................................................. 38 3.6.2 Methodology........................................................................................ 41 3.7 Result Expectations. ...................................................................................... 41 CHAPTER FOUR RESEARCH RESULTS............................................................... 43 4.1 Descriptive Statistic....................................................................................... 43 4.2 Correlation Matrix. ........................................................................................ 45 4.3 Empirical Results........................................................................................... 48 4.3.1 CEO Equity-based Compensation and Investment Opportunity Set... 48 4.3.2 CEO Pay-performance Sensitivity (Delta) and Investment Opportunity Set. ....................................................................................................... 50 4.3.3 CEO Risk-taking Incentives (Vega) and Firm’s Investment Opportunity Set. ....................................................................................................... 51 4.3.4 CEO Compensation, Female CEO, and Firm’s Investment Opportunity Set. ....................................................................................................... 52 4.3.5 The Moderating Effect of CEO Tenure – CEO Equity Pay and Female CEO. .................................................................................................... 54 4.3.6 The Moderating Effect of CEO Tenure – CEO Delta and Female CEO. ............................................................................................................. 56 4.3.7 The Moderating Effect of CEO Tenure – CEO Vega and Female CEO. ............................................................................................................. 57 4.3.8 The Moderating Effect of CEO Total Compensation – Equity Pay and Female CEO. ....................................................................................... 59 4.3.9 The Moderating Effect of CEO Total Compensation –Delta and Female CEO. .................................................................................................... 60 4.3.10 The Moderating Effect of CEO Total Compensation – CEO Vega and Female CEO. ....................................................................................... 62 CHAPTER FIVE CONCLUSION AND SUGGESTIONS ........................................ 64 5.1 Research Conclusions.................................................................................... 64 5.2 Research Implication. ...................... 66 5.3 Research Limitations and Suggestions................. 66 REFERENCES...................................... 67

    Adam, T., & Goyal, V. K. (2008). The investment opportunity set and its proxy variables. Journal of Financial Research, 31(1), 41-63.
    Adams, M. B. (1994). Agency theory and the internal audit. Managerial auditing journal.
    Adams, R. B., & Ferreira, D. (2009). Women in the boardroom and their impact on governance and performance. Journal of financial economics, 94(2), 291-309.
    Aggarwal, R. K., & Samwick, A. A. (2006). Empire-builders and shirkers: Investment, firm performance, and managerial incentives. Journal of Corporate Finance, 12(3), 489-515.
    Anderson, D., Francis, J. R., & Stokes, D. J. (1993). Auditing, directorships and the demand for monitoring. Journal of accounting and public policy, 12(4), 353-375.
    Armstrong, C. S., & Vashishtha, R. (2012). Executive stock options, differential risk-taking incentives, and firm value. Journal of Financial Economics, 104(1), 70-88.
    Baber, W. R., Janakiraman, S. N., & Kang, S.-H. (1996). Investment opportunities and the structure of executive compensation. Journal of Accounting and Economics, 21(3), 297-318.
    Baixauli-Soler, J. S., Belda-Ruiz, M., & Sanchez-Marin, G. (2015). Executive stock options, gender diversity in the top management team, and firm risk taking. Journal of Business Research, 68(2), 451-463.
    Baixauli-Soler, J. S., Belda-Ruiz, M., & Sanchez-Marin, G. (2017). An executive hierarchy analysis of stock options: Does gender matter? Review of Managerial Science, 11(4), 737-766.
    Barua, A., Davidson, L. F., Rama, D. V., & Thiruvadi, S. (2010). CFO gender and accruals quality. Accounting Horizons, 24(1), 25-39.
    Bell, L. A. (2005). Women-led firms and the gender gap in top executive jobs.
    Berger, A. N., & Di Patti, E. B. (2006). Capital structure and firm performance: A new approach to testing agency theory and an application to the banking industry. Journal of Banking & Finance, 30(4), 1065-1102.
    Bernile, G., Bhagwat, V., & Rau, P. R. (2017). What doesn't kill you will only make you more risk‐loving: Early‐life disasters and CEO behavior. The Journal of Finance, 72(1), 167-206.
    Billett, M. T., King, T. H. D., & Mauer, D. C. (2007). Growth opportunities and the choice of leverage, debt maturity, and covenants. The Journal of Finance, 62(2), 697-730.
    Black, F., & Scholes, M. (1973). The pricing of options and corporate liabilities. Journal of political economy, 81(3), 637-654.
    Brown, L. D., & Lee, Y.-J. (2010). The relation between corporate governance and CEOs’ equity grants. Journal of Accounting and Public Policy, 29(6), 533-558.
    Caliskan, D., & Doukas, J. A. (2015). CEO risk preferences and dividend policy decisions. Journal of Corporate Finance, 35, 18-42.
    Carter, S. M. (2006). The interaction of top management group, stakeholder, and situational factors on certain corporate reputation management activities. Journal of Management Studies, 43(5), 1145-1176.
    Chen, D., & Zheng, Y. (2014). CEO tenure and risk-taking. Global Business and Finance Review, 19(1), p1-27.
    Chen, H.-L. (2013). CEO tenure and R&D investment: The moderating effect of board capital. The Journal of Applied Behavioral Science, 49(4), 437-459.
    Chen, J., Leung, W. S., & Goergen, M. (2017). The impact of board gender composition on dividend payouts. Journal of Corporate finance, 43, 86-105.
    Chen, J., Leung, W. S., Song, W., & Goergen, M. (2019). Why female board representation matters: The role of female directors in reducing male CEO overconfidence. Journal of Empirical Finance, 53, 70-90.
    Chen, S.-S., Chung, T.-Y., & Chung, L.-I. (2001). Investment opportunities, free cash flow and stock valuation effects of corporate investments: The case of Taiwanese investments in China. Review of Quantitative Finance and Accounting, 16(4), 299-310.
    Cheng, I. H., Hong, H., & Scheinkman, J. A. (2015). Yesterday's heroes: compensation and risk at financial firms. The Journal of Finance, 70(2), 839-879.
    Chintrakarn, P., Jiraporn, P., Sakr, S., & Lee, S. M. (2016). Do co-opted directors mitigate managerial myopia? Evidence from R&D investments. Finance Research Letters, 17, 285-289.
    Coles, J. L., Daniel, N. D., & Naveen, L. (2006). Managerial incentives and risk-taking. Journal of financial Economics, 79(2), 431-468.
    Conyon, M. J. (2006). Executive compensation and incentives. Academy of Management Perspectives, 20(1), 25-44.
    Core, J., & Guay, W. (1999). The use of equity grants to manage optimal equity incentive levels. Journal of accounting and economics, 28(2), 151-184.
    Core, J., & Guay, W. (2002). Estimating the value of employee stock option portfolios and their sensitivities to price and volatility. Journal of Accounting research, 40(3), 613-630.
    Cremers, M., & Palia, D. (2011). Tenure and CEO pay. Unpublished paper, Yale School of Management.[832].
    Dawson, D. A., & Archer, L. (1992). Gender differences in alcohol consumption: effects of measurement. British journal of addiction, 87(1), 119-123.
    Deaux, K., & Major, B. (1987). Putting gender into context: An interactive model of gender-related behavior. Psychological review, 94(3), 369.
    Doukas, J. A., & Mandal, S. (2018). CEO risk preferences and hedging decisions: A multiyear analysis. Journal of International Money and Finance, 86, 131-153.
    Edmans, A., Gabaix, X., Sadzik, T., & Sannikov, Y. (2009). Dynamic incentive accounts: National Bureau of Economic Research.
    Elloumi, F., & Gueyié, J. P. (2001). CEO compensation, IOS and the role of corporate governance. Corporate Governance: The international journal of business in society.
    Faccio, M., Marchica, M.-T., & Mura, R. (2016). CEO gender, corporate risk-taking, and the efficiency of capital allocation. Journal of Corporate Finance, 39, 193-209.
    Fama, E. F. (1978). The effects of a firm's investment and financing decisions on the welfare of its security holders. The American Economic Review, 68(3), 272-284.
    Finkelstein, S., Hambrick, D., & Cannella, A. A. (1996). Strategic leadership. St. Paul: West Educational Publishing.
    Frye, M. B. (2004). Equity‐based compensation for employees: firm performance and determinants. Journal of Financial Research, 27(1), 31-54.
    Gande, A., & Kalpathy, S. (2017). CEO compensation and risk-taking at financial firms: Evidence from US federal loan assistance. Journal of Corporate Finance, 47, 131-150.
    Gaver, J. J., & Gaver, K. M. (1993). Additional evidence on the association between the investment opportunity set and corporate financing, dividend, and compensation policies. Journal of Accounting and economics, 16(1-3), 125-160.
    Gaver, J. J., & Gaver, K. M. (1995). Compensation policy and the investment opportunity set. Financial management, 19-32.
    Gilligan, C., & Attanucci, J. (1988). Two moral orientations: Gender differences and similarities. Merrill-Palmer Quarterly (1982-), 223-237.
    Graham, J. R., Harvey, C. R., & Rajgopal, S. (2005). The economic implications of corporate financial reporting. Journal of accounting and economics, 40(1-3), 3-73.
    Gregoriou, G. N., & Renneboog, L. (2007). International mergers and acquisitions activity since 1990: Recent research and quantitative analysis: Elsevier.
    Guay, W. R. (1999). The sensitivity of CEO wealth to equity risk: an analysis of the magnitude and determinants. Journal of Financial Economics, 53(1), 43-71.
    Gul, F. A., Srinidhi, B., & Ng, A. C. (2011). Does board gender diversity improve the informativeness of stock prices? Journal of Accounting and Economics, 51(3), 314-338.
    Guthrie, K., Sokolowsky, J., & Wan, K. M. (2012). CEO compensation and board structure revisited. The Journal of Finance, 67(3), 1149-1168.
    Habib, M. A., & Ljungqvist, A. (2005). Firm value and managerial incentives: a stochastic frontier approach. The Journal of Business, 78(6), 2053-2094.
    Harris, O., Karl, J. B., & Lawrence, E. (2019). CEO compensation and earnings management: Does gender really matters? Journal of Business Research, 98, 1-14.
    Heugens, P. P., Van Riel, C. B., & Van Den Bosch, F. A. (2004). Reputation management capabilities as decision rules. Journal of Management Studies, 41(8), 1349-1377.
    Hinz, R. P., McCarthy, D. D., & Turner, J. A. (1997). Are women conservative investors? Gender differences in participant-directed pension investments. Positioning pensions for the twenty-first century, 91, 103.
    Hirshleifer, D., & Suh, Y. (1992). Risk, managerial effort, and project choice. Journal of Financial Intermediation, 2(3), 308-345.
    Ho, P.-H., Huang, C.-W., Lin, C.-Y., & Yen, J.-F. (2016). CEO overconfidence and financial crisis: Evidence from bank lending and leverage. Journal of Financial Economics, 120(1), 194-209.
    Hossain, M., Cahan, S. F., & Adams, M. B. (2000). The investment opportunity set and the voluntary use of outside directors: New Zealand evidence. Accounting and Business Research, 30(4), 263-273.
    Huang, J., & Kisgen, D. J. (2013). Gender and corporate finance: Are male executives overconfident relative to female executives? Journal of financial Economics, 108(3), 822-839.
    Hull, R. M., & Dawar, V. (2014). Agency theory, capital structure and firm performance: some Indian evidence. Managerial Finance.
    Hutchinson, M., & Gul, F. A. (2004). Investment opportunity set, corporate governance practices and firm performance. Journal of corporate finance, 10(4), 595-614.
    Jensen, & Meckling. (1995). WH (1995):“Specific and general knowledge, and organizational structure”. Journal of Applied Corporate Finance, 8(2), 4-18.
    Jensen, M. C. (1986). Agency costs of free cash flow, corporate finance, and takeovers. The American economic review, 76(2), 323-329.
    Jiang, J. X., Petroni, K. R., & Wang, I. Y. (2010). CFOs and CEOs: Who have the most influence on earnings management? Journal of Financial Economics, 96(3), 513-526.
    Jurkus, A. F., Park, J. C., & Woodard, L. S. (2011). Women in top management and agency costs. Journal of Business Research, 64(2), 180-186.
    Kallapur, S., & Trombley, M. A. (1999). The association between investment opportunity set proxies and realized growth. Journal of Business Finance & Accounting, 26(3‐4), 505-519.
    Kallapur, S., & Trombley, M. A. (2001). The investment opportunity set: determinants, consequences and measurement. Managerial finance.
    Kim, H. T., Kwak, B., Lee, J., & Suk, I. (2019). CEO and Outside Director Equity Compensation: Substitutes or Complements for Management Earnings Forecasts? European Accounting Review, 28(2), 371-393.
    Kulich, C., Trojanowski, G., Ryan, M. K., Alexander Haslam, S., & Renneboog, L. D. (2011). Who gets the carrot and who gets the stick? Evidence of gender disparities in executive remuneration. Strategic Management Journal, 32(3), 301-321.
    Kyaw, K., Olugbode, M., & Petracci, B. (2015). Does gender diverse board mean less earnings management? Finance Research Letters, 14, 135-141.
    Lakhal, F., Aguir, A., Lakhal, N., & Malek, A. (2015). Do women on boards and in top management reduce earnings management? Evidence in France. Journal of Applied Business Research (JABR), 31(3), 1107-1118.
    Lam, K. C., McGuinness, P. B., & Vieito, J. P. (2013). CEO gender, executive compensation and firm performance in Chinese‐listed enterprises. Pacific-Basin Finance Journal, 21(1), 1136-1159.
    Larraza‐Kintana, M., Wiseman, R. M., Gomez‐Mejia, L. R., & Welbourne, T. M. (2007). Disentangling compensation and employment risks using the behavioral agency model. Strategic Management Journal, 28(10), 1001-1019.
    Levi, M., Li, K., & Zhang, F. (2014). Director gender and mergers and acquisitions. Journal of Corporate Finance, 28, 185-200.
    Lewellen, K. (2006). Does option compensation increase managerial risk appetite? Journal of Financial Economics, 82, 551-589.
    Li, L., & Kuo, C.-S. (2017). CEO equity compensation and earnings management: The role of growth opportunities. Finance Research Letters, 20, 289-295.
    Li, R., & Wang, M. (2018). Moral hazard, agency cost, and firm growth. International Review of Finance.
    Li, Y., & Zeng, Y. (2019). The impact of top executive gender on asset prices: Evidence from stock price crash risk. Journal of Corporate Finance, 58, 528-550.
    Lilienfeld‐toal, u. v., & Ruenzi, S. (2014). CEO ownership, stock market performance, and managerial discretion. The Journal of Finance, 69(3), 1013-1050.
    Liu, Y., & Mauer, D. C. (2011). Corporate cash holdings and CEO compensation incentives. Journal of financial economics, 102(1), 183-198.
    Low, A. (2009). Managerial risk-taking behavior and equity-based compensation. Journal of Financial Economics, 92(3), 470-490.
    Matsa, D. A., & Miller, A. R. (2013). A female style in corporate leadership? Evidence from quotas. American Economic Journal: Applied Economics, 5(3), 136-169.
    McDonald, R., & Siegel, D. (1986). The value of waiting to invest. The quarterly journal of economics, 101(4), 707-727.
    Meckling, W. H., & Jensen, M. C. (1976). Theory of the firm: Managerial behavior, agency costs and ownership structure. Journal of financial economics, 3(4), 305-360.
    Mehran, H. (1992). Executive incentive plans, corporate control, and capital structure. Journal of Financial and Quantitative analysis, 539-560.
    Merton, R. C. (1973). Theory of rational option pricing. The Bell Journal of economics and management science, 141-183.
    Miroshnychenko, I., Barontini, R., & De Massis, A. (2019). Investment opportunities and R&D investments in family and nonfamily firms. R&D Management.
    Mohan, N., & Ruggiero, J. (2003). Compensation differences between male and female CEOs for publicly traded firms: a nonparametric analysis. Journal of the Operational Research Society, 54(12), 1242-1248.
    Murwaningsari, E., & Rachmawati, S. (2017). The influence of capital intensity and investment opportunity set toward conservatism with managerial ownership as moderating variable. Journal of Advanced Management Science, 5(6).
    Musteen, M., Barker III, V. L., & Baeten, V. L. (2006). CEO attributes associated with attitude toward change: The direct and moderating effects of CEO tenure. Journal of Business Research, 59(5), 604-612.
    Myers, S. C. (1977). Determinants of corporate borrowing. Journal of financial economics, 5(2), 147-175.
    Nagar, V., Nanda, D., & Wysocki, P. (2003). Discretionary disclosure and stock-based incentives. Journal of accounting and economics, 34(1-3), 283-309.
    Oesterle, M.-J., Elosge, C., & Elosge, L. (2016). Me, myself and I: The role of CEO narcissism in internationalization decisions. International Business Review, 25(5), 1114-1123.
    Oh, W.-Y., Chang, Y. K., & Jung, R. (2018). Experience-based human capital or fixed paradigm problem? CEO tenure, contextual influences, and corporate social (ir) responsibility. Journal of Business Research, 90, 325-333.
    Powell, M., & Ansic, D. (1997). Gender differences in risk behaviour in financial decision-making: An experimental analysis. Journal of economic psychology, 18(6), 605-628.
    Raelin, J. D., & Bondy, K. (2013). Putting the good back in good corporate governance: The presence and problems of double‐layered agency theory. Corporate Governance: An International Review, 21(5), 420-435.
    Romano, M., Favino, C., Pennacchio, L., & Grimaldi, F. (2020). CEO social capital in family businesses and its effect on investment opportunities: Asset or liability? Corporate Social Responsibility and Environmental Management.
    Ross, S. A. (2004). Compensation, incentives, and the duality of risk aversion and riskiness. The Journal of Finance, 59(1), 207-225.
    Sanders, W. G. (2001). Incentive alignment, CEO pay level, and firm performance: A case of “Heads I win, tails you lose”? Human Resource Management: Published in Cooperation with the School of Business Administration, The University of Michigan and in alliance with the Society of Human Resources Management, 40(2), 159-170.
    Schubert, R., Gysler, M., Brown, M., & Brachinger, H.-W. (2000). Gender specific attitudes towards risk and ambiguity: an experimental investigation: Economics Working Paper Series.
    Shawver, T. J., Bancroft, P., & Sennetti, J. (2006). Can the ‘clan effect’reduce the gender sensitivity to fraud? The case of the IPO environment. Journal of Forensic Accounting, 7(1), 185-208.
    Sindarta, C. (2019). The Effect of Geographic Location on Investment Efficiency. 成功大學國際經營管理研究所學位論文, 1-64.
    Skinner, D. J. (1993). The investment opportunity set and accounting procedure choice: Preliminary evidence. Journal of accounting and economics, 16(4), 407-445.
    Smith, C. W., & Stulz, R. M. (1985). The determinants of firms' hedging policies. Journal of financial and quantitative analysis, 20(4), 391-405.
    Smith Jr, C. W., & Watts, R. L. (1992). The investment opportunity set and corporate financing, dividend, and compensation policies. Journal of financial Economics, 32(3), 263-292.
    Song, W.-L., & Wan, K.-M. (2019). Does CEO compensation reflect managerial ability or managerial power? Evidence from the compensation of powerful CEOs. Journal of Corporate Finance, 56, 1-14.
    Vieito, J. P., & Khan, W. A. (2012). Executive compensation and gender: S&P 1500 listed firms. Journal of Economics and Finance, 36(2), 371-399.
    Wiseman, R. M., & Gomez-Mejia, L. R. (1998). A behavioral agency model of managerial risk taking. Academy of management Review, 23(1), 133-153.
    Yeo, H.-J. (2018). Role of free cash flows in making investment and dividend decisions: The case of the shipping industry. The Asian Journal of Shipping and Logistics, 34(2), 113-118.
    Yu, H. (2019). How Does CEO Equity-based Compensation Affect Firm's Propensity of Issuing New Securities? Journal of Applied Finance and Banking, 9(4), 99-121.

    下載圖示 校內:2025-07-15公開
    校外:2025-07-15公開
    QR CODE